Procedurally Fair Co-Determination with Endogeneous Value Uncertainty: An Experiment

Procedurally Fair Co-Determination with Endogeneous Value Uncertainty: An Experiment

We present an experimental test of a procedurally fair co-determination mechanism where group members reduce their value uncertainty before submitting bids for a joint project. The results suggest a relatively efficient mechanism, with unprofitable projects being largely rejected and profitable ones...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Werner Güth, Ludivine Martin, Tibor Neugebauer, Sotiria Xanalatou
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2025-04-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
corporate governance
joint venture
experiment
auction
uncertainty
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/2/19
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https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/2/19

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