Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks
While ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are well-understood, practical implementations face various vulnerabilities, such as side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections. Current security proofs for decoy-state BB84 protocols either assume uniform phase randomization of Alice’...
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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AIP Publishing LLC
2025-06-01
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| Series: | APL Photonics |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/5.0260685 |
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| _version_ | 1849422467831955456 |
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| author | Jerome Wiesemann Fadri Grünenfelder Ana Blázquez Coído Nino Walenta Davide Rusca |
| author_facet | Jerome Wiesemann Fadri Grünenfelder Ana Blázquez Coído Nino Walenta Davide Rusca |
| author_sort | Jerome Wiesemann |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | While ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are well-understood, practical implementations face various vulnerabilities, such as side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections. Current security proofs for decoy-state BB84 protocols either assume uniform phase randomization of Alice’s signals, which is compromised by practical limitations and attacks like injection locking, or rely on a (partially) characterized phase distribution. This work presents an experimental method to characterize the phase de-randomization from injection locking using a heterodyne detection setup, providing a lower bound on the degree of isolation required to protect QKD transmitters against injection-locking attacks. The methods presented are source-agnostic and can be used to evaluate general QKD systems against injection-locking attacks. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e851bfb3e26344bf89d2aef818f4c608 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2378-0967 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-06-01 |
| publisher | AIP Publishing LLC |
| record_format | Article |
| series | APL Photonics |
| spelling | doaj-art-e851bfb3e26344bf89d2aef818f4c6082025-08-20T03:31:06ZengAIP Publishing LLCAPL Photonics2378-09672025-06-01106066112066112-1210.1063/5.0260685Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacksJerome Wiesemann0Fadri Grünenfelder1Ana Blázquez Coído2Nino Walenta3Davide Rusca4Fraunhofer Institute for Telecommunications, Heinrich Hertz Institute, HHI, 10587 Berlin, GermanyVigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo, Vigo E-36310, SpainVigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo, Vigo E-36310, SpainFraunhofer Institute for Telecommunications, Heinrich Hertz Institute, HHI, 10587 Berlin, GermanyVigo Quantum Communication Center, University of Vigo, Vigo E-36310, SpainWhile ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are well-understood, practical implementations face various vulnerabilities, such as side-channel attacks resulting from device imperfections. Current security proofs for decoy-state BB84 protocols either assume uniform phase randomization of Alice’s signals, which is compromised by practical limitations and attacks like injection locking, or rely on a (partially) characterized phase distribution. This work presents an experimental method to characterize the phase de-randomization from injection locking using a heterodyne detection setup, providing a lower bound on the degree of isolation required to protect QKD transmitters against injection-locking attacks. The methods presented are source-agnostic and can be used to evaluate general QKD systems against injection-locking attacks.http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/5.0260685 |
| spellingShingle | Jerome Wiesemann Fadri Grünenfelder Ana Blázquez Coído Nino Walenta Davide Rusca Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks APL Photonics |
| title | Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks |
| title_full | Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks |
| title_fullStr | Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks |
| title_short | Evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection-locking attacks |
| title_sort | evaluation of quantum key distribution systems against injection locking attacks |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/5.0260685 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jeromewiesemann evaluationofquantumkeydistributionsystemsagainstinjectionlockingattacks AT fadrigrunenfelder evaluationofquantumkeydistributionsystemsagainstinjectionlockingattacks AT anablazquezcoido evaluationofquantumkeydistributionsystemsagainstinjectionlockingattacks AT ninowalenta evaluationofquantumkeydistributionsystemsagainstinjectionlockingattacks AT daviderusca evaluationofquantumkeydistributionsystemsagainstinjectionlockingattacks |