On the Nash Equilibria of a Simple Discounted Duel
We formulate and study a two-player, duel game as a nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game. Players P1, and P2 are standing in place and, in each turn, one or both may shoot at the other player. If Pn shoots at Pm (m ≠ n), either he hits and kills him (with probability pn) or he misses him and Pm is...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wrocław University of Science and Technology
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Operations Research and Decisions |
| Online Access: | https://ord.pwr.edu.pl/assets/papers_archive/ord2024vol34no2_5.pdf |
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