Evolution Game Model of Travel Mode Choice in Metropolitan

The paper describes an evolution game model of travel mode choice to determine whether transportation policies would have the desired effect. The model is first expressed as a two-stage sequential game in the extensive form based on the similarity between evolution game theory and the travel mode ch...

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Main Authors: Chaoqun Wu, Yulong Pei, Jingpeng Gao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2015-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/638972
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author Chaoqun Wu
Yulong Pei
Jingpeng Gao
author_facet Chaoqun Wu
Yulong Pei
Jingpeng Gao
author_sort Chaoqun Wu
collection DOAJ
description The paper describes an evolution game model of travel mode choice to determine whether transportation policies would have the desired effect. The model is first expressed as a two-stage sequential game in the extensive form based on the similarity between evolution game theory and the travel mode choice process. Second, backward induction is used to solve for Nash equilibrium of the game based on the Folk Theorem. Third, the sensitivity analysis suggests that a payoff reduction of travel by any mode will result in a rising proportion of inhabitants travelling by that mode and falling proportions of inhabitants travelling by other modes. Finally, the model is applied to Beijing inhabitants’ travel mode choices during morning peak hours and draws the conclusion that the proportion of inhabitants travelling by rail would increase when traffic congestion is more severe. This confirms that fast construction of the urban rail transit would be an effective means of alleviating traffic congestion. The model may be a useful tool for policy makers for analyzing the complex influence of travel mode choice processes on transport policies and transport construction projects.
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institution Kabale University
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spelling doaj-art-a6a8a46e593f45ec81f5b1c61e7793e72025-02-03T05:46:12ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2015-01-01201510.1155/2015/638972638972Evolution Game Model of Travel Mode Choice in MetropolitanChaoqun Wu0Yulong Pei1Jingpeng Gao2School of Transportation Science and Engineering, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150090, ChinaTraffic College, Northeast Forestry University, Harbin 150040, ChinaCollege of Information and Communication Engineering, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, ChinaThe paper describes an evolution game model of travel mode choice to determine whether transportation policies would have the desired effect. The model is first expressed as a two-stage sequential game in the extensive form based on the similarity between evolution game theory and the travel mode choice process. Second, backward induction is used to solve for Nash equilibrium of the game based on the Folk Theorem. Third, the sensitivity analysis suggests that a payoff reduction of travel by any mode will result in a rising proportion of inhabitants travelling by that mode and falling proportions of inhabitants travelling by other modes. Finally, the model is applied to Beijing inhabitants’ travel mode choices during morning peak hours and draws the conclusion that the proportion of inhabitants travelling by rail would increase when traffic congestion is more severe. This confirms that fast construction of the urban rail transit would be an effective means of alleviating traffic congestion. The model may be a useful tool for policy makers for analyzing the complex influence of travel mode choice processes on transport policies and transport construction projects.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/638972
spellingShingle Chaoqun Wu
Yulong Pei
Jingpeng Gao
Evolution Game Model of Travel Mode Choice in Metropolitan
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
title Evolution Game Model of Travel Mode Choice in Metropolitan
title_full Evolution Game Model of Travel Mode Choice in Metropolitan
title_fullStr Evolution Game Model of Travel Mode Choice in Metropolitan
title_full_unstemmed Evolution Game Model of Travel Mode Choice in Metropolitan
title_short Evolution Game Model of Travel Mode Choice in Metropolitan
title_sort evolution game model of travel mode choice in metropolitan
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/638972
work_keys_str_mv AT chaoqunwu evolutiongamemodeloftravelmodechoiceinmetropolitan
AT yulongpei evolutiongamemodeloftravelmodechoiceinmetropolitan
AT jingpenggao evolutiongamemodeloftravelmodechoiceinmetropolitan