La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?

The 25th of January 2012, Chairman Bernanke’s Fed announced a 2% inflation target, although this idea was not accepted under previous Chairman Greenspan. How and why the Fed has changed its preferences? How does the Fed justify its decision? To tackle these questions, the approach of central bank co...

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Main Author: Emmanuel Carré
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Association Recherche & Régulation 2013-12-01
Series:Revue de la Régulation
Subjects:
Online Access:https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/10401
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author Emmanuel Carré
author_facet Emmanuel Carré
author_sort Emmanuel Carré
collection DOAJ
description The 25th of January 2012, Chairman Bernanke’s Fed announced a 2% inflation target, although this idea was not accepted under previous Chairman Greenspan. How and why the Fed has changed its preferences? How does the Fed justify its decision? To tackle these questions, the approach of central bank communication is followed. Like Meade (2010), Meade and Thornton (2012), transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee meetings are examined, as well as its speeches and minutes. The article inspects the origins of the Fed’s inflation target by establishing the history of the debate on the inflation target (and inflation targeting) inside the Fed since 1995. Next are examined the design and theoretical foundations of the inflation target presented in Fed’s communications, especially in the context of current financial crisis. Finally, we analyze the theoretical and empirical limits of the inflation target’s foundations.
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spelling doaj-art-90c3280fc08e41d9a4c821b4a197e0722025-01-30T14:26:29ZengAssociation Recherche & RégulationRevue de la Régulation1957-77962013-12-011410.4000/regulation.10401La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?Emmanuel CarréThe 25th of January 2012, Chairman Bernanke’s Fed announced a 2% inflation target, although this idea was not accepted under previous Chairman Greenspan. How and why the Fed has changed its preferences? How does the Fed justify its decision? To tackle these questions, the approach of central bank communication is followed. Like Meade (2010), Meade and Thornton (2012), transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee meetings are examined, as well as its speeches and minutes. The article inspects the origins of the Fed’s inflation target by establishing the history of the debate on the inflation target (and inflation targeting) inside the Fed since 1995. Next are examined the design and theoretical foundations of the inflation target presented in Fed’s communications, especially in the context of current financial crisis. Finally, we analyze the theoretical and empirical limits of the inflation target’s foundations.https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/10401inflation targetinflation targeting regimecommunication
spellingShingle Emmanuel Carré
La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?
Revue de la Régulation
inflation target
inflation targeting regime
communication
title La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?
title_full La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?
title_fullStr La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?
title_full_unstemmed La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?
title_short La cible d’inflation de la Fed : continuité ou rupture ?
title_sort la cible d inflation de la fed continuite ou rupture
topic inflation target
inflation targeting regime
communication
url https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/10401
work_keys_str_mv AT emmanuelcarre lacibledinflationdelafedcontinuiteourupture