Stability of the Evolutionary Game System and Control Strategies of Behavior Instability in Coal Mine Safety Management
In this paper, we try to find the right control method for the game behavior instability in coal mine safety management. Through the analysis and comparison of the system stability with inflexible and flexible costs and penalties, it can be concluded that the dynamical game system with flexible cost...
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Main Authors: | Xinhua Wang, Rongwu Lu, Hao Yu, Dan Li |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley
2019-01-01
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Series: | Complexity |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/6987427 |
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