Evolution game model of offense-defense for network security based on system dynamics
An offense-defense game model with learning mechanism in the case of asymmetric information was proposed based on non-cooperation evolution game theory.Combined with utility function,the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the offense-defense process were proved.Simulation by system dyna...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | zho |
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Editorial Department of Journal on Communications
2014-01-01
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| Series: | Tongxin xuebao |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.joconline.com.cn/zh/article/doi/3969/j.issn.1000-436x.2014.01.007/ |
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| _version_ | 1841539742788747264 |
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| author | Jian-ming ZHU Biao SONG Qi-fa HUANG |
| author_facet | Jian-ming ZHU Biao SONG Qi-fa HUANG |
| author_sort | Jian-ming ZHU |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | An offense-defense game model with learning mechanism in the case of asymmetric information was proposed based on non-cooperation evolution game theory.Combined with utility function,the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the offense-defense process were proved.Simulation by system dynamics shows that there is Nash equilibrium in evolutionary game model after introducing the dynamic penalty strategy of the third party.Therefore,when improving all kinds of security technology,promoting attacker tracing technology,enhancing the censorship of network attack behaviors and dynamic penalty are fundamental ways to information security. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-7e145f34b2cf42fc8ca59e9746fa7b3a |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1000-436X |
| language | zho |
| publishDate | 2014-01-01 |
| publisher | Editorial Department of Journal on Communications |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Tongxin xuebao |
| spelling | doaj-art-7e145f34b2cf42fc8ca59e9746fa7b3a2025-01-14T06:42:27ZzhoEditorial Department of Journal on CommunicationsTongxin xuebao1000-436X2014-01-0135546159678732Evolution game model of offense-defense for network security based on system dynamicsJian-ming ZHUBiao SONGQi-fa HUANGAn offense-defense game model with learning mechanism in the case of asymmetric information was proposed based on non-cooperation evolution game theory.Combined with utility function,the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the offense-defense process were proved.Simulation by system dynamics shows that there is Nash equilibrium in evolutionary game model after introducing the dynamic penalty strategy of the third party.Therefore,when improving all kinds of security technology,promoting attacker tracing technology,enhancing the censorship of network attack behaviors and dynamic penalty are fundamental ways to information security.http://www.joconline.com.cn/zh/article/doi/3969/j.issn.1000-436x.2014.01.007/information securitygamesystem dynamicsdynamic penalty |
| spellingShingle | Jian-ming ZHU Biao SONG Qi-fa HUANG Evolution game model of offense-defense for network security based on system dynamics Tongxin xuebao information security game system dynamics dynamic penalty |
| title | Evolution game model of offense-defense for network security based on system dynamics |
| title_full | Evolution game model of offense-defense for network security based on system dynamics |
| title_fullStr | Evolution game model of offense-defense for network security based on system dynamics |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolution game model of offense-defense for network security based on system dynamics |
| title_short | Evolution game model of offense-defense for network security based on system dynamics |
| title_sort | evolution game model of offense defense for network security based on system dynamics |
| topic | information security game system dynamics dynamic penalty |
| url | http://www.joconline.com.cn/zh/article/doi/3969/j.issn.1000-436x.2014.01.007/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jianmingzhu evolutiongamemodelofoffensedefensefornetworksecuritybasedonsystemdynamics AT biaosong evolutiongamemodelofoffensedefensefornetworksecuritybasedonsystemdynamics AT qifahuang evolutiongamemodelofoffensedefensefornetworksecuritybasedonsystemdynamics |