Misleading Higher-Order Evidence, Conflicting Ideals, and Defeasible Logic
Thinking about misleading higher-order evidence naturally leads to a puzzle about epistemic rationality: If one’s total evidence can be radically misleading regarding itself, then two widely-accepted requirements of rationality come into conflict, suggesting that there are rational dilemmas. This pa...
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| Main Author: | Aleks Knoks |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Michigan Publishing
2021-12-01
|
| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1143/ |
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