Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets
One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of th...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
2024-12-01
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| Series: | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design |
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http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v009-1/p_05.pdf
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| author | Scott Duke Kominers |
| author_facet | Scott Duke Kominers |
| author_sort | Scott Duke Kominers |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of the entry comparative static, by way of a well-known property of deferred acceptance called respect for improvements. Our argument extends to yield comparative static results in more general settings, such as matching with slot-specific preferences. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-3cec3926d0434b3798a26e4dc7df329a |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2399-844X 2399-8458 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-12-01 |
| publisher | Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design |
| spelling | doaj-art-3cec3926d0434b3798a26e4dc7df329a2025-08-20T02:36:15ZengSociety for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution DesignJournal of Mechanism and Institution Design2399-844X2399-84582024-12-01918310410.22574/jmid.2024.12.005jmi-v9i1a5Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching MarketsScott Duke Kominers0 Harvard University and a16z crypto, USA One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of the entry comparative static, by way of a well-known property of deferred acceptance called respect for improvements. Our argument extends to yield comparative static results in more general settings, such as matching with slot-specific preferences. http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v009-1/p_05.pdf matchingmarket entryrespect for improvements |
| spellingShingle | Scott Duke Kominers Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design matching market entry respect for improvements |
| title | Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets |
| title_full | Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets |
| title_fullStr | Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets |
| title_full_unstemmed | Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets |
| title_short | Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets |
| title_sort | respect for improvements and comparative statics in matching markets |
| topic | matching market entry respect for improvements |
| url |
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v009-1/p_05.pdf
|
| work_keys_str_mv | AT scottdukekominers respectforimprovementsandcomparativestaticsinmatchingmarkets |