Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets
One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of th...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
2024-12-01
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| Series: | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: |
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v009-1/p_05.pdf
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