On the Relevance of Self-Disclosure for Epistemic Responsibility
A number of authors have argued that, in order for S to be appropriately held morally responsible for some action or attitude (say, via moral blame), that action or attitude must somehow reflect or express a negative aspect of S’s (“true,” “deep,” or “real”) self. Recently, theorists of “epistemic b...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Michigan Publishing
2025-01-01
|
| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/7135/ |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|