The Driving Forces of Diffusion in John R. Commons’ Institutional Economics
In this article, I reconstruct John R. Commons’ theory of institutional evolution: I draw a trajectory from where a novel principle at the micro level reached a compromise with old principles at the macro level. In the process, the uniqueness of Commons’ evolutionary theory is highlighted and a forg...
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Association Recherche & Régulation
2016-12-01
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Online Access: | https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/12079 |
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author | Kota Kitagawa |
author_facet | Kota Kitagawa |
author_sort | Kota Kitagawa |
collection | DOAJ |
description | In this article, I reconstruct John R. Commons’ theory of institutional evolution: I draw a trajectory from where a novel principle at the micro level reached a compromise with old principles at the macro level. In the process, the uniqueness of Commons’ evolutionary theory is highlighted and a forgotten challenge for modern evolutionary and institutional economics is uncovered: the need to explore the spiritual driving forces in history in a specific time and space. In drawing the trajectory in Commons’ centerpiece work Institutional Economics (IE), the following two points are highlighted. First, “institutions” themselves (defined as “going concerns” where the collective action controls member actions), carry novel principles and evolve through their diffusion process. The novel principles discussed here are industrial democracy and safety. Second, the spiritual driving force unique to the era pushed ahead the evolution and diffusion of the institution. This force is similar to a religious devotion to industrial democracy and safety. In order to confirm these “genuine” unique aspects, I compare Commons’ theory with French modern institutionalism and with modern evolutionary economics reconsidering old institutionalism. |
format | Article |
id | doaj-art-29a4f7f99a4d480dac155f1f8a4cc3ec |
institution | Kabale University |
issn | 1957-7796 |
language | English |
publishDate | 2016-12-01 |
publisher | Association Recherche & Régulation |
record_format | Article |
series | Revue de la Régulation |
spelling | doaj-art-29a4f7f99a4d480dac155f1f8a4cc3ec2025-01-30T14:26:51ZengAssociation Recherche & RégulationRevue de la Régulation1957-77962016-12-012010.4000/regulation.12079The Driving Forces of Diffusion in John R. Commons’ Institutional EconomicsKota KitagawaIn this article, I reconstruct John R. Commons’ theory of institutional evolution: I draw a trajectory from where a novel principle at the micro level reached a compromise with old principles at the macro level. In the process, the uniqueness of Commons’ evolutionary theory is highlighted and a forgotten challenge for modern evolutionary and institutional economics is uncovered: the need to explore the spiritual driving forces in history in a specific time and space. In drawing the trajectory in Commons’ centerpiece work Institutional Economics (IE), the following two points are highlighted. First, “institutions” themselves (defined as “going concerns” where the collective action controls member actions), carry novel principles and evolve through their diffusion process. The novel principles discussed here are industrial democracy and safety. Second, the spiritual driving force unique to the era pushed ahead the evolution and diffusion of the institution. This force is similar to a religious devotion to industrial democracy and safety. In order to confirm these “genuine” unique aspects, I compare Commons’ theory with French modern institutionalism and with modern evolutionary economics reconsidering old institutionalism.https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/12079collective actionJ.R. Commonsleader roleswillingnessinstitutional diffusionprinciples |
spellingShingle | Kota Kitagawa The Driving Forces of Diffusion in John R. Commons’ Institutional Economics Revue de la Régulation collective action J.R. Commons leader roles willingness institutional diffusion principles |
title | The Driving Forces of Diffusion in John R. Commons’ Institutional Economics |
title_full | The Driving Forces of Diffusion in John R. Commons’ Institutional Economics |
title_fullStr | The Driving Forces of Diffusion in John R. Commons’ Institutional Economics |
title_full_unstemmed | The Driving Forces of Diffusion in John R. Commons’ Institutional Economics |
title_short | The Driving Forces of Diffusion in John R. Commons’ Institutional Economics |
title_sort | driving forces of diffusion in john r commons institutional economics |
topic | collective action J.R. Commons leader roles willingness institutional diffusion principles |
url | https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/12079 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT kotakitagawa thedrivingforcesofdiffusioninjohnrcommonsinstitutionaleconomics AT kotakitagawa drivingforcesofdiffusioninjohnrcommonsinstitutionaleconomics |