Stationary Bayesian–Markov Equilibria in Bayesian Stochastic Games with Periodic Revelation
I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on a continuous type space. Types are privately informed, but they become public together with actions when payoffs are obtained, resulting in a delayed information revelation....
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2024-09-01
|
| Series: | Games |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/15/5/31 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|