Platitudes and opacity: Explaining philosophical uncertainty
In The Moral Problem, Smith defended an analysis of moral judgments based on a number of platitudes about morality. The platitudes are supposed to constitute conceptual constraints which an analysis of moral terms must capture "on pain of not being an analysis of moral terms at all". This...
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Main Authors: | Eriksson John, Francén Ragnar |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Philosophy
2024-01-01
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Series: | Belgrade Philosophical Annual |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0353-3891/2024/0353-38912401081E.pdf |
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