Emission Control in an <i>n</i>-Firm Oligopoly Game with Product Differentiation

Emission Control in an <i>n</i>-Firm Oligopoly Game with Product Differentiation

Is it possible to control NPS (non-point source) pollution whose sources, sizes, and origins are difficult to identify? This study provides a positive answer in a non-cooperative <i>n</i>-firm oligopoly model in which the firms determine levels of differentiated goods and abatement techn...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2025-06-01
Series:Mathematics
Subjects:
NPS pollution
effective ambient charge
<i>n</i>-firm Cournot oligopoly
optimal abatement technology
homogeneous firms
heterogeneous firms
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/12/2007
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https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/12/2007

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