On Davidson’s Metaphor Theory
Davidson placed his critical approach mostly opposite the semantic theories of metaphor. Accordingly, metaphors – as the opposite of these theories – should to be assumed as having only one meaning. Davidson distinguished statements as matters of meaning and use. Metaphors have only one meaning and...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Istanbul University Press
2022-07-01
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| Series: | Felsefe Arkivi |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://cdn.istanbul.edu.tr/file/JTA6CLJ8T5/0808A912EA334323A8C62E064EBBD798 |
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| Summary: | Davidson placed his critical approach mostly opposite the semantic theories of metaphor. Accordingly, metaphors – as the opposite of these theories – should to be assumed as having only one meaning. Davidson distinguished statements as matters of meaning and use. Metaphors have only one meaning and are clearly false expressions. However, speakers are mostly disposed to state expressions that they believe to be true. Therefore, uttering a false expression on purpose must not be a matter of meaning but of use. Metaphors are matters of use due to their falsity and affect the listener similar to a nudge. One result of this effect may be to make comparisons or find some similarities. However, these processes occur after finding out meanings, so they cannot be semantic. Therefore, Davidson considered metaphoric expressions to be neither cognitive, semantic, nor propositional. Furthermore, he denied the views in theories that look at metaphors as elliptical similes. In addition one of his positive definitions of him, relies on Wittgenstein’s rabbit-duck visual (R-D illusion). Accordingly, metaphors cause not one thing to be seen but one thing to be seen as another. As such, the phenomenon of seeing-as is a good way to explain metaphors. I will examine the three important features of Davidson’s theory in this study, after giving the main points of Davidson’s theory of metaphor. The first is the relationship between metaphors and similes and their problems. The second one is the problems of explaining metaphors by seeing-as. The last one is related to the claim that metaphors have only one meaning. Despite the problems of this claim, I shall try to show the aspects of the claim that provide solutions as good as if not better than semantic or pragmatic metaphor theories. Also, I shall attempt to establish the relationships among Davidson’s theory of metaphor, his own theory of meaning, and other theories of metaphor. |
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| ISSN: | 2667-7644 |