Civil Disobedience, Costly Signals, and Leveraging Injustice
Civil disobedience, despite its illegal nature, can sometimes be justified vis-à-vis the duty to obey the law, and, arguably, is thereby not liable to legal punishment. However, adhering to the demands of justice and refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience may lead to a highly problem...
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Michigan Publishing
2021-10-01
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| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1137/ |
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| author | Ten-Herng Lai |
| author_facet | Ten-Herng Lai |
| author_sort | Ten-Herng Lai |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Civil disobedience, despite its illegal nature, can sometimes be justified vis-à-vis the duty to obey the law, and, arguably, is thereby not liable to legal punishment. However, adhering to the demands of justice and refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience may lead to a highly problematic theoretical consequence: the debilitation of civil disobedience. This is because, according to the novel analysis I propose, civil disobedience primarily functions as a costly social signal. It is effective by being reliable, reliable by being costly, and costly primarily by being punished. My analysis will highlight a distinctive feature of civil disobedience: civil disobedients leverage the punitive injustice they suffer to amplify their communicative force. This will lead to two paradoxical implications. First, the instability of the moral status of both civil disobedience and its punishment to the extent where the state may be left with no permissible course of action with regard to punishing civil disobedience. Second, by refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience, the state may render uncivil disobedience—illegal political activities that fall short of the standards of civil disobedience—potentially permissible.Click the links below to download an audio version of this article's content:Full article (with endnotes read after the main text)Full article (with footnotes read as they appear in the main text) |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-fb0e03f874804dc5a5e41a1d55172c5a |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2330-4014 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-10-01 |
| publisher | Michigan Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-fb0e03f874804dc5a5e41a1d55172c5a2025-08-20T02:43:43ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142021-10-017010.3998/ergo.1137Civil Disobedience, Costly Signals, and Leveraging InjusticeTen-Herng Lai0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9760-2240University of StirlingCivil disobedience, despite its illegal nature, can sometimes be justified vis-à-vis the duty to obey the law, and, arguably, is thereby not liable to legal punishment. However, adhering to the demands of justice and refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience may lead to a highly problematic theoretical consequence: the debilitation of civil disobedience. This is because, according to the novel analysis I propose, civil disobedience primarily functions as a costly social signal. It is effective by being reliable, reliable by being costly, and costly primarily by being punished. My analysis will highlight a distinctive feature of civil disobedience: civil disobedients leverage the punitive injustice they suffer to amplify their communicative force. This will lead to two paradoxical implications. First, the instability of the moral status of both civil disobedience and its punishment to the extent where the state may be left with no permissible course of action with regard to punishing civil disobedience. Second, by refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience, the state may render uncivil disobedience—illegal political activities that fall short of the standards of civil disobedience—potentially permissible.Click the links below to download an audio version of this article's content:Full article (with endnotes read after the main text)Full article (with footnotes read as they appear in the main text)https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1137/civil disobediencepunishmentcostly signalsparadoxfair play theory |
| spellingShingle | Ten-Herng Lai Civil Disobedience, Costly Signals, and Leveraging Injustice Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy civil disobedience punishment costly signals paradox fair play theory |
| title | Civil Disobedience, Costly Signals, and Leveraging Injustice |
| title_full | Civil Disobedience, Costly Signals, and Leveraging Injustice |
| title_fullStr | Civil Disobedience, Costly Signals, and Leveraging Injustice |
| title_full_unstemmed | Civil Disobedience, Costly Signals, and Leveraging Injustice |
| title_short | Civil Disobedience, Costly Signals, and Leveraging Injustice |
| title_sort | civil disobedience costly signals and leveraging injustice |
| topic | civil disobedience punishment costly signals paradox fair play theory |
| url | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1137/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT tenhernglai civildisobediencecostlysignalsandleveraginginjustice |