Empty Reference in Sixteenth-Century Nominalism: John Mair’s Case

Most nominalist logicians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries believed that we could conceive of and refer to impossible objects. The articulation of the semantics of impossibility that underlined this view is much less known than that of their fourteenth-century predecessors, and it may at fir...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Alt Guido
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: De Gruyter 2025-04-01
Series:Open Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2025-0070
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1849699357536813056
author Alt Guido
author_facet Alt Guido
author_sort Alt Guido
collection DOAJ
description Most nominalist logicians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries believed that we could conceive of and refer to impossible objects. The articulation of the semantics of impossibility that underlined this view is much less known than that of their fourteenth-century predecessors, and it may at first seem to conflict with that tradition’s core principle of theoretical parsimony. Here, I propose a first analysis of John Mair’s case and argue that a central part of that development concerns the theory of signification itself. I will examine his views on empty reference and imaginable impossibilities in relation to John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, and John Dorp of Leiden, as well as an anonymous work known as the Hagenau commentary. By doing so, I intend to show that his approach to empty reference is closely connected to issues of conceptual representation.
format Article
id doaj-art-fa839f2d7ec14f1caa0f7ae5fc91105f
institution DOAJ
issn 2543-8875
language English
publishDate 2025-04-01
publisher De Gruyter
record_format Article
series Open Philosophy
spelling doaj-art-fa839f2d7ec14f1caa0f7ae5fc91105f2025-08-20T03:18:37ZengDe GruyterOpen Philosophy2543-88752025-04-0181577910.1515/opphil-2025-0070Empty Reference in Sixteenth-Century Nominalism: John Mair’s CaseAlt Guido0Humanities and Arts Department, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, IsraelMost nominalist logicians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries believed that we could conceive of and refer to impossible objects. The articulation of the semantics of impossibility that underlined this view is much less known than that of their fourteenth-century predecessors, and it may at first seem to conflict with that tradition’s core principle of theoretical parsimony. Here, I propose a first analysis of John Mair’s case and argue that a central part of that development concerns the theory of signification itself. I will examine his views on empty reference and imaginable impossibilities in relation to John Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, and John Dorp of Leiden, as well as an anonymous work known as the Hagenau commentary. By doing so, I intend to show that his approach to empty reference is closely connected to issues of conceptual representation.https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2025-0070nominalismempty referencejohn mairmarsilius of inghenintentionality
spellingShingle Alt Guido
Empty Reference in Sixteenth-Century Nominalism: John Mair’s Case
Open Philosophy
nominalism
empty reference
john mair
marsilius of inghen
intentionality
title Empty Reference in Sixteenth-Century Nominalism: John Mair’s Case
title_full Empty Reference in Sixteenth-Century Nominalism: John Mair’s Case
title_fullStr Empty Reference in Sixteenth-Century Nominalism: John Mair’s Case
title_full_unstemmed Empty Reference in Sixteenth-Century Nominalism: John Mair’s Case
title_short Empty Reference in Sixteenth-Century Nominalism: John Mair’s Case
title_sort empty reference in sixteenth century nominalism john mair s case
topic nominalism
empty reference
john mair
marsilius of inghen
intentionality
url https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2025-0070
work_keys_str_mv AT altguido emptyreferenceinsixteenthcenturynominalismjohnmairscase