Language Is a “Quite Useless” Tool: A Rejoinder to Fedorenko, Piantadosi, and Gibson’s “Language Is Primarily a Tool for Communication Rather Than Thought”
Contrary to the prevailing assumption that language is “primarily a tool for communication rather than thought”, I argue that language is, to invoke Oscar Wilde, “quite useless”. Arguing from aesthetic philosophy and the minimalist program for linguistic theory, I conject that language, like art, is...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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PsychOpen GOLD/ Leibniz Institute for Psychology
2024-10-01
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| Series: | Biolinguistics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.5964/bioling.15229 |
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| Summary: | Contrary to the prevailing assumption that language is “primarily a tool for communication rather than thought”, I argue that language is, to invoke Oscar Wilde, “quite useless”. Arguing from aesthetic philosophy and the minimalist program for linguistic theory, I conject that language, like art, is not “for” anything—it simply is, conforming to aesthetic rather than utilitarian principles. Of course, like art, language can be a powerful instrument of communication, but its function is not that of expressing thought; it creates thoughts, “primarily” for communicating with oneself, engaging in Popperian critical rationalism, making thoughts (e.g., sentences, constructive proofs) to match Platonic objects (e.g., propositions, classical proofs). |
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| ISSN: | 1450-3417 |