A Deflationary Account of Information in Terms of Probability
In this paper, I argue that information is nothing more than an abstract object; therefore, it does not exist fundamentally. It is neither a concrete physical entity nor a form of “stuff” that “flows” through communication channels or that is “carried” by vehicles or that is stored in memories, mess...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2025-05-01
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| Series: | Entropy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/27/5/514 |
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| Summary: | In this paper, I argue that information is nothing more than an abstract object; therefore, it does not exist fundamentally. It is neither a concrete physical entity nor a form of “stuff” that “flows” through communication channels or that is “carried” by vehicles or that is stored in memories, messages, books, or brains—these are misleading metaphors. To support this thesis, I adopt three different approaches. First, I present a series of concrete cases that challenge our commonsensical belief that information is a real entity. Second, I apply Eleaticism (the principle that entities lacking causal efficacy do not exist). Finally, I provide a mathematical derivation showing that information reduces to probability and is therefore unnecessary both ontologically and epistemically. In conclusion, I maintain that information is a causally redundant epistemic construct that does not exist fundamentally, regardless of its remarkable epistemic convenience. What, then, is information? It is merely a very efficient way of describing reality—a manner of speaking, nothing more. |
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| ISSN: | 1099-4300 |