Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model
The signal gaming model based on incomplete information is used to analyze the decisions of commercial banks and medium-sized and small enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain finance business. It is found that the returns of banks are closely relied on the probability of good SMEs join which is proporti...
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| Main Authors: | Zhang Tao, Xin Li, Xinquan Liu, Nana Feng |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2019-01-01
|
| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3646097 |
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