Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model
The signal gaming model based on incomplete information is used to analyze the decisions of commercial banks and medium-sized and small enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain finance business. It is found that the returns of banks are closely relied on the probability of good SMEs join which is proporti...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2019-01-01
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| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3646097 |
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| _version_ | 1849692304905863168 |
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| author | Zhang Tao Xin Li Xinquan Liu Nana Feng |
| author_facet | Zhang Tao Xin Li Xinquan Liu Nana Feng |
| author_sort | Zhang Tao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The signal gaming model based on incomplete information is used to analyze the decisions of commercial banks and medium-sized and small enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain finance business. It is found that the returns of banks are closely relied on the probability of good SMEs join which is proportional to θ (the probability of “good” SMEs in the market) and p (the probability of “good” SMEs chosen to join the supply chain finance) in supply chain finance business, and the default cost is an important constrain for determining the strategies adopted by the SMEs and the banks. To achieve higher returns, SMEs and banks should make effects to create a better supply chain finance business environment to achieve the separation equilibrium. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-f1ca0bfa179946b79fbc7c6b602b7553 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2019-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-f1ca0bfa179946b79fbc7c6b602b75532025-08-20T03:20:44ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2019-01-01201910.1155/2019/36460973646097Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information ModelZhang Tao0Xin Li1Xinquan Liu2Nana Feng3Nanning Normal University, ChinaMacau University of Science and Technology, MacauNanning Normal University, ChinaNanning Normal University, ChinaThe signal gaming model based on incomplete information is used to analyze the decisions of commercial banks and medium-sized and small enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain finance business. It is found that the returns of banks are closely relied on the probability of good SMEs join which is proportional to θ (the probability of “good” SMEs in the market) and p (the probability of “good” SMEs chosen to join the supply chain finance) in supply chain finance business, and the default cost is an important constrain for determining the strategies adopted by the SMEs and the banks. To achieve higher returns, SMEs and banks should make effects to create a better supply chain finance business environment to achieve the separation equilibrium.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3646097 |
| spellingShingle | Zhang Tao Xin Li Xinquan Liu Nana Feng Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model |
| title_full | Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model |
| title_fullStr | Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model |
| title_full_unstemmed | Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model |
| title_short | Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model |
| title_sort | analysis of signal game for supply chain finance scf of mses and banks based on incomplete information model |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3646097 |
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