Reluctance to initiate cooperation: the trade-off between effectiveness and hesitation in the sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma
Previous research suggests that initiating cooperation in a sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma fosters mutual cooperation. We hypothesized that sense of control, defined as the belief that one's cooperative decision will be reciprocated, plays a crucial role in fostering mutual coopera...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2025-04-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Behavioral Economics |
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| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frbhe.2025.1449488/full |
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| author | Hirofumi Hashimoto Kanako Naganobu Kaede Maeda Shigehito Tanida |
| author_facet | Hirofumi Hashimoto Kanako Naganobu Kaede Maeda Shigehito Tanida |
| author_sort | Hirofumi Hashimoto |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Previous research suggests that initiating cooperation in a sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma fosters mutual cooperation. We hypothesized that sense of control, defined as the belief that one's cooperative decision will be reciprocated, plays a crucial role in fostering mutual cooperation. To test this, we conducted two experiments comparing three conditions. In the simultaneous condition, both players made their decisions at the same time. In the self-first condition, participants made their decisions first in a sequential setting. In the other-first condition, they made their decision after observing their partner's choice. The results indicate that initiating cooperation increases the likelihood of mutual cooperation. However, participants were reluctant to be the first to cooperate, despite its effectiveness. Our paper discusses these findings from a cross-cultural psychological perspective, highlighting potential differences in cooperative behavior across cultural contexts. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ecb8a4941e1c483a8cd02e6bdabda0cd |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2813-5296 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-04-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Behavioral Economics |
| spelling | doaj-art-ecb8a4941e1c483a8cd02e6bdabda0cd2025-08-20T02:54:37ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Behavioral Economics2813-52962025-04-01410.3389/frbhe.2025.14494881449488Reluctance to initiate cooperation: the trade-off between effectiveness and hesitation in the sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemmaHirofumi Hashimoto0Kanako Naganobu1Kaede Maeda2Shigehito Tanida3Graduate School of Literature and Human Sciences, Osaka Metropolitan University, Osaka, JapanGraduate School of Literature and Human Sciences, Osaka Metropolitan University, Osaka, JapanDepartment of Psychology, College of Contemporary Psychology, Rikkyo University, Niiza, JapanFaculty of Human Studies, Taisho University, Tokyo, JapanPrevious research suggests that initiating cooperation in a sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma fosters mutual cooperation. We hypothesized that sense of control, defined as the belief that one's cooperative decision will be reciprocated, plays a crucial role in fostering mutual cooperation. To test this, we conducted two experiments comparing three conditions. In the simultaneous condition, both players made their decisions at the same time. In the self-first condition, participants made their decisions first in a sequential setting. In the other-first condition, they made their decision after observing their partner's choice. The results indicate that initiating cooperation increases the likelihood of mutual cooperation. However, participants were reluctant to be the first to cooperate, despite its effectiveness. Our paper discusses these findings from a cross-cultural psychological perspective, highlighting potential differences in cooperative behavior across cultural contexts.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frbhe.2025.1449488/fullcooperationsense of controlsimultaneous one-shot prisoner's dilemma gamesequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma gameself-reported willingness |
| spellingShingle | Hirofumi Hashimoto Kanako Naganobu Kaede Maeda Shigehito Tanida Reluctance to initiate cooperation: the trade-off between effectiveness and hesitation in the sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma Frontiers in Behavioral Economics cooperation sense of control simultaneous one-shot prisoner's dilemma game sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma game self-reported willingness |
| title | Reluctance to initiate cooperation: the trade-off between effectiveness and hesitation in the sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma |
| title_full | Reluctance to initiate cooperation: the trade-off between effectiveness and hesitation in the sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma |
| title_fullStr | Reluctance to initiate cooperation: the trade-off between effectiveness and hesitation in the sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reluctance to initiate cooperation: the trade-off between effectiveness and hesitation in the sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma |
| title_short | Reluctance to initiate cooperation: the trade-off between effectiveness and hesitation in the sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma |
| title_sort | reluctance to initiate cooperation the trade off between effectiveness and hesitation in the sequential one shot prisoner s dilemma |
| topic | cooperation sense of control simultaneous one-shot prisoner's dilemma game sequential one-shot prisoner's dilemma game self-reported willingness |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frbhe.2025.1449488/full |
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