SELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT
Self-reference and the Limits of Thought. This paper explores the connection between the natural language and a formal language from a particular point of view: self-referential constructions. Such constructions lead to some kind of limits of thought, either in the form of paradoxical constructions...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Babeș-Bolyai University
2019-11-01
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| Series: | Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia |
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| Online Access: | https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/3119 |
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| author | Lucian Constantin PETRAŞ |
| author_facet | Lucian Constantin PETRAŞ |
| author_sort | Lucian Constantin PETRAŞ |
| collection | DOAJ |
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Self-reference and the Limits of Thought. This paper explores the connection between the natural language and a formal language from a particular point of view: self-referential constructions. Such constructions lead to some kind of limits of thought, either in the form of paradoxical constructions (Liar-type or Grelling-type), or in the form of the so called limitative theorems in mathematical logic (e.g. Gödel’s theorem). By deriving Gödel’s significant results from paradoxical constructions the limitative character of such self-referential constructions is preserved, but they open the ways for a new representation of a great variety of arguments in the field of logic, mathematics and philosophy.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-eb4f13a1838543f5b8f62037951e8c8b |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2065-9407 |
| language | deu |
| publishDate | 2019-11-01 |
| publisher | Babeș-Bolyai University |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia |
| spelling | doaj-art-eb4f13a1838543f5b8f62037951e8c8b2025-08-20T03:58:17ZdeuBabeș-Bolyai UniversityStudia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia2065-94072019-11-0164Special Issue10.24193/subbphil.2019.spiss.08SELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHTLucian Constantin PETRAŞ0PhD candidate, Doctoral School of Philosophy, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Email: lucian.petras@ravago.ro. Self-reference and the Limits of Thought. This paper explores the connection between the natural language and a formal language from a particular point of view: self-referential constructions. Such constructions lead to some kind of limits of thought, either in the form of paradoxical constructions (Liar-type or Grelling-type), or in the form of the so called limitative theorems in mathematical logic (e.g. Gödel’s theorem). By deriving Gödel’s significant results from paradoxical constructions the limitative character of such self-referential constructions is preserved, but they open the ways for a new representation of a great variety of arguments in the field of logic, mathematics and philosophy. https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/3119self-reference, paradox, incompleteness theorems, Gödel, Grelling |
| spellingShingle | Lucian Constantin PETRAŞ SELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai. Philosophia self-reference, paradox, incompleteness theorems, Gödel, Grelling |
| title | SELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT |
| title_full | SELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT |
| title_fullStr | SELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT |
| title_full_unstemmed | SELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT |
| title_short | SELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT |
| title_sort | self reference and the limits of thought |
| topic | self-reference, paradox, incompleteness theorems, Gödel, Grelling |
| url | https://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/3119 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lucianconstantinpetras selfreferenceandthelimitsofthought |