Super groups or fair leagues? Rich-get-richer dynamics can drive capture despite active redistribution in professional basketball
Much of modern society is founded on orchestrating institutions that produce social goods by fostering motivated groups, pitting them against each other, and distributing the fruits of the arms races that ensue. In this paper, we explore how institutions may change over time and, using the example o...
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| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Social Sciences and Humanities Open |
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| Online Access: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291125003031 |
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| author | Adam Sawyer Seth Frey |
| author_facet | Adam Sawyer Seth Frey |
| author_sort | Adam Sawyer |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Much of modern society is founded on orchestrating institutions that produce social goods by fostering motivated groups, pitting them against each other, and distributing the fruits of the arms races that ensue. In this paper, we explore how institutions may change over time and, using the example of competitive balance in professional basketball, analyze whether these changes expose institutions to capture by the few or equilibrium among members. Using outcomes of over 60,000 contests from four professional sports leagues, more than 100 years’ worth of seasons, we compute the evolving rate of transitivity violations (A > B, B > C, but C > A) to measure the ability of leagues to maintain parity between teams and support the efficient generation and distribution of innovation. Comparing against a baseline of randomly permuted outcomes, we find that leagues become less competitive over time, suggesting that teams diverge in performance, and reflecting a possible failure of market makers to tame their overpowered teams. Our results suggest that rich-get-richer dynamics are so pernicious that they can even emerge under the watch of a powerful administrator that is motivated to prevent them. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-eaf21a6b355143d7ba2176be703912b6 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2590-2911 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Social Sciences and Humanities Open |
| spelling | doaj-art-eaf21a6b355143d7ba2176be703912b62025-08-20T03:30:51ZengElsevierSocial Sciences and Humanities Open2590-29112025-01-011110157510.1016/j.ssaho.2025.101575Super groups or fair leagues? Rich-get-richer dynamics can drive capture despite active redistribution in professional basketballAdam Sawyer0Seth Frey1Syracuse University, USAComputational Communication Lab, Department of Communication, University of California Davis, USA; Corresponding author. Kerr Hall 376 UC Davis, 1 Shields Dr, Davis, CA, 95616, USA.Much of modern society is founded on orchestrating institutions that produce social goods by fostering motivated groups, pitting them against each other, and distributing the fruits of the arms races that ensue. In this paper, we explore how institutions may change over time and, using the example of competitive balance in professional basketball, analyze whether these changes expose institutions to capture by the few or equilibrium among members. Using outcomes of over 60,000 contests from four professional sports leagues, more than 100 years’ worth of seasons, we compute the evolving rate of transitivity violations (A > B, B > C, but C > A) to measure the ability of leagues to maintain parity between teams and support the efficient generation and distribution of innovation. Comparing against a baseline of randomly permuted outcomes, we find that leagues become less competitive over time, suggesting that teams diverge in performance, and reflecting a possible failure of market makers to tame their overpowered teams. Our results suggest that rich-get-richer dynamics are so pernicious that they can even emerge under the watch of a powerful administrator that is motivated to prevent them.http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291125003031CompetitionMarket captureMatthew effectRegulationRich-get-richerTransitivity |
| spellingShingle | Adam Sawyer Seth Frey Super groups or fair leagues? Rich-get-richer dynamics can drive capture despite active redistribution in professional basketball Social Sciences and Humanities Open Competition Market capture Matthew effect Regulation Rich-get-richer Transitivity |
| title | Super groups or fair leagues? Rich-get-richer dynamics can drive capture despite active redistribution in professional basketball |
| title_full | Super groups or fair leagues? Rich-get-richer dynamics can drive capture despite active redistribution in professional basketball |
| title_fullStr | Super groups or fair leagues? Rich-get-richer dynamics can drive capture despite active redistribution in professional basketball |
| title_full_unstemmed | Super groups or fair leagues? Rich-get-richer dynamics can drive capture despite active redistribution in professional basketball |
| title_short | Super groups or fair leagues? Rich-get-richer dynamics can drive capture despite active redistribution in professional basketball |
| title_sort | super groups or fair leagues rich get richer dynamics can drive capture despite active redistribution in professional basketball |
| topic | Competition Market capture Matthew effect Regulation Rich-get-richer Transitivity |
| url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590291125003031 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT adamsawyer supergroupsorfairleaguesrichgetricherdynamicscandrivecapturedespiteactiveredistributioninprofessionalbasketball AT sethfrey supergroupsorfairleaguesrichgetricherdynamicscandrivecapturedespiteactiveredistributioninprofessionalbasketball |