Constitutional imaginaries, rationality, and creation
In current debates on the constitutional imaginary, different dimensions are stressed in distinct contributions, ranging from philosophical and legal–theoretical, to sociological and socio–legal approaches. To situate Jiří Přibáň’s work in this larger scheme of reflection on the imaginary, this arti...
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Cambridge University Press
2025-06-01
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| Series: | European Law Open |
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| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2752613525000062/type/journal_article |
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| author | Paul Blokker |
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| description | In current debates on the constitutional imaginary, different dimensions are stressed in distinct contributions, ranging from philosophical and legal–theoretical, to sociological and socio–legal approaches. To situate Jiří Přibáň’s work in this larger scheme of reflection on the imaginary, this article identifies a number of core angles. Unlike Přibáň’s systems theoretical interpretation of imaginaries, Castoriadis’s philosophy of creative imagination puts emphasis on uniqueness, on historical creation ex nihilo, or the creation of worlds without a precedent in the existing world and without presuming any clear function. This also means that imaginaries relate to forms of meaning that cannot be reduced to binaries, codes, or structural languages (legitimacy – illegitimacy) that keep society together, but rather relate to meaning that can never be fully articulated or theoretically entirely grasped and explained. However, Přibáň does not ultimately fully reduce constitutional imaginaries to functional vehicles as becomes clear in his acknowledgement of the polysemy and polyvalence of functionally differentiated society. From this perspective, the contemporary populist challenge to constitutionalism appears to be based on a struggle between technocratic forces promoting a modern, legal–rational imaginary of constitutionalism, whereas populist forces endorse a constitutional imaginary that is grounded in traditionalism and authenticity. This counter-constitutional populist challenge is not merely about a rejection of liberal democratic orders but regards the questioning of the rational–scientific imagination as such. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-ea5698e964c345579a8115879e53f939 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2752-6135 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-06-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | European Law Open |
| spelling | doaj-art-ea5698e964c345579a8115879e53f9392025-08-20T09:23:28ZengCambridge University PressEuropean Law Open2752-61352025-06-01440240610.1017/elo.2025.6Constitutional imaginaries, rationality, and creationPaul Blokker0https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4352-6478Department of Sociology and Business Law, Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna, Bologna, ItalyIn current debates on the constitutional imaginary, different dimensions are stressed in distinct contributions, ranging from philosophical and legal–theoretical, to sociological and socio–legal approaches. To situate Jiří Přibáň’s work in this larger scheme of reflection on the imaginary, this article identifies a number of core angles. Unlike Přibáň’s systems theoretical interpretation of imaginaries, Castoriadis’s philosophy of creative imagination puts emphasis on uniqueness, on historical creation ex nihilo, or the creation of worlds without a precedent in the existing world and without presuming any clear function. This also means that imaginaries relate to forms of meaning that cannot be reduced to binaries, codes, or structural languages (legitimacy – illegitimacy) that keep society together, but rather relate to meaning that can never be fully articulated or theoretically entirely grasped and explained. However, Přibáň does not ultimately fully reduce constitutional imaginaries to functional vehicles as becomes clear in his acknowledgement of the polysemy and polyvalence of functionally differentiated society. From this perspective, the contemporary populist challenge to constitutionalism appears to be based on a struggle between technocratic forces promoting a modern, legal–rational imaginary of constitutionalism, whereas populist forces endorse a constitutional imaginary that is grounded in traditionalism and authenticity. This counter-constitutional populist challenge is not merely about a rejection of liberal democratic orders but regards the questioning of the rational–scientific imagination as such.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2752613525000062/type/journal_articleconstitutional imaginariessocial imaginariesconstitutional populismcreative imaginationEuropean constitutionalism |
| spellingShingle | Paul Blokker Constitutional imaginaries, rationality, and creation European Law Open constitutional imaginaries social imaginaries constitutional populism creative imagination European constitutionalism |
| title | Constitutional imaginaries, rationality, and creation |
| title_full | Constitutional imaginaries, rationality, and creation |
| title_fullStr | Constitutional imaginaries, rationality, and creation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Constitutional imaginaries, rationality, and creation |
| title_short | Constitutional imaginaries, rationality, and creation |
| title_sort | constitutional imaginaries rationality and creation |
| topic | constitutional imaginaries social imaginaries constitutional populism creative imagination European constitutionalism |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2752613525000062/type/journal_article |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT paulblokker constitutionalimaginariesrationalityandcreation |