Transferring Non-Responsibility
The Direct Argument argues for the claim that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. The most controversial assumption of the argument is the thought that "not being responsible for" transfers across conditionals: if no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fa...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2019-12-01
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| Series: | Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/70004 |
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| _version_ | 1849744436753334272 |
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| author | Pedro Merlussi Gabriel de Andrade Maruchi |
| author_facet | Pedro Merlussi Gabriel de Andrade Maruchi |
| author_sort | Pedro Merlussi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The Direct Argument argues for the claim that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. The most controversial assumption of the argument is the thought that "not being responsible for" transfers across conditionals: if no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p is true, and no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p ? q is true, then no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that q is true. Here we argue that the principle is true if one accepts a truth-maker account of the relationship between non-responsibility and propositions. While non-responsibility transfers across conditionals, one upshot of the truth-maker account is that it allows one to be responsible for necessary truths.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e9eb850b920343299def7fb123ed1a87 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1677-2954 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2019-12-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-e9eb850b920343299def7fb123ed1a872025-08-20T03:17:24ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaEthic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy1677-29542019-12-0118310.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p28533827Transferring Non-ResponsibilityPedro Merlussi0https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4729-1143Gabriel de Andrade Maruchi1UnicampUnicampThe Direct Argument argues for the claim that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. The most controversial assumption of the argument is the thought that "not being responsible for" transfers across conditionals: if no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p is true, and no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p ? q is true, then no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that q is true. Here we argue that the principle is true if one accepts a truth-maker account of the relationship between non-responsibility and propositions. While non-responsibility transfers across conditionals, one upshot of the truth-maker account is that it allows one to be responsible for necessary truths. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/70004 |
| spellingShingle | Pedro Merlussi Gabriel de Andrade Maruchi Transferring Non-Responsibility Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
| title | Transferring Non-Responsibility |
| title_full | Transferring Non-Responsibility |
| title_fullStr | Transferring Non-Responsibility |
| title_full_unstemmed | Transferring Non-Responsibility |
| title_short | Transferring Non-Responsibility |
| title_sort | transferring non responsibility |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/70004 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pedromerlussi transferringnonresponsibility AT gabrieldeandrademaruchi transferringnonresponsibility |