Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States
Much of the literature on Presidentialism focuses on the argument that bipartisan presidential systems are better able to avoid an intense Executive-Legislative relation by facilitating the formation of coalitions in Congress and the partisan ideological identification. From a comparative perspectiv...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2019-08-01
|
| Series: | Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.journals.unam.mx/index.php/rmcpys/article/view/65206 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1850211172588978176 |
|---|---|
| author | Matheus Lucas Hebling Flávio Contrera |
| author_facet | Matheus Lucas Hebling Flávio Contrera |
| author_sort | Matheus Lucas Hebling |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Much of the literature on Presidentialism focuses on the argument that bipartisan presidential systems are better able to avoid an intense Executive-Legislative relation by facilitating the formation of coalitions in Congress and the partisan ideological identification. From a comparative perspective, this study aims to identify and discuss the powers of the presidents of the United States and Brazil in promoting their actions as producers of public policy and checking the degree of conflict in the production of such policies by checking legislative vetoes. In addition, we analyze the success rate of draft laws of welfare policies voted in the lower house of the two countries and supported by their respective presidents. Our time frame covers a period of 16 years in each country (from 1995 to 2010 in Brazil and in the United States from 1993 to 2008), with eight years of more liberal administrations and eight years of more conservative governments in each country. The hypothesis is that there is no significant difference regarding the conflict and production of public policies in two-party or multi-party systems and that success rates are similar. The data were analyzed using multivariate regressions and will undergo a qualitative treatment for a deeper understanding. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e9dbb7954ef1414d902115dace74f9e4 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 0185-1918 2448-492X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2019-08-01 |
| publisher | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales |
| spelling | doaj-art-e9dbb7954ef1414d902115dace74f9e42025-08-20T02:09:37ZengUniversidad Nacional Autónoma de MéxicoRevista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales0185-19182448-492X2019-08-016423710.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2019.237.65206Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United StatesMatheus Lucas Hebling0Flávio Contrera1University of CampinasFederal University of São CarlosMuch of the literature on Presidentialism focuses on the argument that bipartisan presidential systems are better able to avoid an intense Executive-Legislative relation by facilitating the formation of coalitions in Congress and the partisan ideological identification. From a comparative perspective, this study aims to identify and discuss the powers of the presidents of the United States and Brazil in promoting their actions as producers of public policy and checking the degree of conflict in the production of such policies by checking legislative vetoes. In addition, we analyze the success rate of draft laws of welfare policies voted in the lower house of the two countries and supported by their respective presidents. Our time frame covers a period of 16 years in each country (from 1995 to 2010 in Brazil and in the United States from 1993 to 2008), with eight years of more liberal administrations and eight years of more conservative governments in each country. The hypothesis is that there is no significant difference regarding the conflict and production of public policies in two-party or multi-party systems and that success rates are similar. The data were analyzed using multivariate regressions and will undergo a qualitative treatment for a deeper understanding.https://www.journals.unam.mx/index.php/rmcpys/article/view/65206PresidentialismVetoExecutive-Legislative Power Relations. |
| spellingShingle | Matheus Lucas Hebling Flávio Contrera Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales Presidentialism Veto Executive-Legislative Power Relations. |
| title | Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States |
| title_full | Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States |
| title_fullStr | Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States |
| title_full_unstemmed | Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States |
| title_short | Presidential Power, Vetoes, and Public Policy: a Comparative Study between Brazil and the United States |
| title_sort | presidential power vetoes and public policy a comparative study between brazil and the united states |
| topic | Presidentialism Veto Executive-Legislative Power Relations. |
| url | https://www.journals.unam.mx/index.php/rmcpys/article/view/65206 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT matheuslucashebling presidentialpowervetoesandpublicpolicyacomparativestudybetweenbrazilandtheunitedstates AT flaviocontrera presidentialpowervetoesandpublicpolicyacomparativestudybetweenbrazilandtheunitedstates |