Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective
If someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are correct. The skeptical threat from disagreement...
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| Language: | English |
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Michigan Publishing
2021-12-01
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| Series: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1155/ |
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| author | Sinan Dogramaci |
| author_facet | Sinan Dogramaci |
| author_sort | Sinan Dogramaci |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | If someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are correct. The skeptical threat from disagreement is thus a kind of moral lottery, to adapt a similar metaphor from Sharon Street. Her own genealogical debunking argument, as I discuss, relies on a premise of such disagreement among evolutionary counterparts.In this paper, I resist the threat from disagreement by showing that, on some of the most influential and most attractive theories of content determination, the premise of moral disagreement cannot serve any skeptical or revisionary purposes. I examine and criticize attempts, made by Gilbert Harman and Sharon Street, to argue from disagreement to relativism by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that, within certain constraints, maximizes the attribution to us of true beliefs. And I examine and criticize Robert Williams’s attempt to show there is moral disagreement by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that instead maximizes the attribution to us of rationality. My overall aim is to defend commonsense moral realism via a careful look at the theory of content and concepts. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e9740d97721f44a6a5e8d3e2347a201c |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 2330-4014 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-12-01 |
| publisher | Michigan Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-e9740d97721f44a6a5e8d3e2347a201c2025-08-20T02:13:24ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142021-12-018010.3998/ergo.1155Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic PerspectiveSinan Dogramaci0The University of Texas at AustinIf someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are correct. The skeptical threat from disagreement is thus a kind of moral lottery, to adapt a similar metaphor from Sharon Street. Her own genealogical debunking argument, as I discuss, relies on a premise of such disagreement among evolutionary counterparts.In this paper, I resist the threat from disagreement by showing that, on some of the most influential and most attractive theories of content determination, the premise of moral disagreement cannot serve any skeptical or revisionary purposes. I examine and criticize attempts, made by Gilbert Harman and Sharon Street, to argue from disagreement to relativism by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that, within certain constraints, maximizes the attribution to us of true beliefs. And I examine and criticize Robert Williams’s attempt to show there is moral disagreement by relying on a theory of content determination that involves a principle that instead maximizes the attribution to us of rationality. My overall aim is to defend commonsense moral realism via a careful look at the theory of content and concepts.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1155/ |
| spellingShingle | Sinan Dogramaci Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| title | Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective |
| title_full | Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective |
| title_fullStr | Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective |
| title_short | Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective |
| title_sort | are we playing a moral lottery moral disagreement from a metasemantic perspective |
| url | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1155/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sinandogramaci areweplayingamorallotterymoraldisagreementfromametasemanticperspective |