How Do “One-Time Bidding, Average Price Win” Land Auction Rules Affect Land Prices: A Quasinatural Experiment in Suzhou, China
The land price reflects the supply and demand relationship in the land market and plays an important role in regulating land use. Improving land auction rules is of great significance for avoiding abnormal fluctuations in the land market and promoting the sustainable use of land resources. To regula...
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MDPI AG
2024-10-01
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| Series: | Land |
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| author | Duo Chai Shunru Li Pengyuan Zhang |
| author_facet | Duo Chai Shunru Li Pengyuan Zhang |
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| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The land price reflects the supply and demand relationship in the land market and plays an important role in regulating land use. Improving land auction rules is of great significance for avoiding abnormal fluctuations in the land market and promoting the sustainable use of land resources. To regulate the abnormal fluctuations in the state-owned land use rights’ auction prices, Chinese local governments have implemented a “sealed one-time bidding, average price wins” rule. However, limited theoretical and empirical research that assesses its policy impact exists. This study examines the policy motivations behind this rule, constructing three game models; namely, static complete information, static incomplete information, and multiperiod repeated games. By deducing bidding strategies and equilibrium results, hypotheses are formulated. A baseline difference-in-differences (DID) and a dynamic policy effect model are designed, and the Python crawler is used to obtain 1182 microland auction samples in Suzhou. This study evaluates the impact of the one-time bidding rule on the starting prices, transaction prices, and premium rates. The empirical results underwent multiple robustness tests, eliminating potential endogeneity issues and biases. The results show that while the policy is effective in restraining the premium rate, indicating the bidding intensity in single-land auctions, it proves challenging to curb the long-term rise in land prices through continuous bidding auctions. Moreover, the policy may stimulate local governments to increase auction starting prices. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e91c65b411cc41b291d4517590209bef |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2073-445X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-10-01 |
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| series | Land |
| spelling | doaj-art-e91c65b411cc41b291d4517590209bef2025-08-20T02:47:58ZengMDPI AGLand2073-445X2024-10-011311174010.3390/land13111740How Do “One-Time Bidding, Average Price Win” Land Auction Rules Affect Land Prices: A Quasinatural Experiment in Suzhou, ChinaDuo Chai0Shunru Li1Pengyuan Zhang2School of Government, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, ChinaChina Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, ChinaSchool of Public Finance and Taxation, Hebei University of Economics and Business, Shijiazhuang 050061, ChinaThe land price reflects the supply and demand relationship in the land market and plays an important role in regulating land use. Improving land auction rules is of great significance for avoiding abnormal fluctuations in the land market and promoting the sustainable use of land resources. To regulate the abnormal fluctuations in the state-owned land use rights’ auction prices, Chinese local governments have implemented a “sealed one-time bidding, average price wins” rule. However, limited theoretical and empirical research that assesses its policy impact exists. This study examines the policy motivations behind this rule, constructing three game models; namely, static complete information, static incomplete information, and multiperiod repeated games. By deducing bidding strategies and equilibrium results, hypotheses are formulated. A baseline difference-in-differences (DID) and a dynamic policy effect model are designed, and the Python crawler is used to obtain 1182 microland auction samples in Suzhou. This study evaluates the impact of the one-time bidding rule on the starting prices, transaction prices, and premium rates. The empirical results underwent multiple robustness tests, eliminating potential endogeneity issues and biases. The results show that while the policy is effective in restraining the premium rate, indicating the bidding intensity in single-land auctions, it proves challenging to curb the long-term rise in land prices through continuous bidding auctions. Moreover, the policy may stimulate local governments to increase auction starting prices.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/13/11/1740auction of land use rightstate-owned landone-time bidding auctiongame analysis modeldifference-in-difference (DID) model |
| spellingShingle | Duo Chai Shunru Li Pengyuan Zhang How Do “One-Time Bidding, Average Price Win” Land Auction Rules Affect Land Prices: A Quasinatural Experiment in Suzhou, China Land auction of land use right state-owned land one-time bidding auction game analysis model difference-in-difference (DID) model |
| title | How Do “One-Time Bidding, Average Price Win” Land Auction Rules Affect Land Prices: A Quasinatural Experiment in Suzhou, China |
| title_full | How Do “One-Time Bidding, Average Price Win” Land Auction Rules Affect Land Prices: A Quasinatural Experiment in Suzhou, China |
| title_fullStr | How Do “One-Time Bidding, Average Price Win” Land Auction Rules Affect Land Prices: A Quasinatural Experiment in Suzhou, China |
| title_full_unstemmed | How Do “One-Time Bidding, Average Price Win” Land Auction Rules Affect Land Prices: A Quasinatural Experiment in Suzhou, China |
| title_short | How Do “One-Time Bidding, Average Price Win” Land Auction Rules Affect Land Prices: A Quasinatural Experiment in Suzhou, China |
| title_sort | how do one time bidding average price win land auction rules affect land prices a quasinatural experiment in suzhou china |
| topic | auction of land use right state-owned land one-time bidding auction game analysis model difference-in-difference (DID) model |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/13/11/1740 |
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