Pierre’s Rational and Public Beliefs
Paradigmatic cases of disagreement seem not to be compatible with a widespread kind of solution to Kripke’s celebrated Pierre puzzle. As a result, the classical puzzle about rational belief is shown to be also a puzzle about public disagreement/agreement phenomena. In this paper, I defend that the...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2012-09-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/28340 |
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| author | Victor Verdejo |
| author_facet | Victor Verdejo |
| author_sort | Victor Verdejo |
| collection | DOAJ |
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Paradigmatic cases of disagreement seem not to be compatible with a widespread kind of solution to Kripke’s celebrated Pierre puzzle. As a result, the classical puzzle about rational belief is shown to be also a puzzle about public disagreement/agreement phenomena. In this paper, I defend that the new public version of the puzzle is substantial and challenging and conclude that a full solution to Kripke’s considerations must offer a satisfactory account of both the rational and public character of belief attributions. I then argue that a notion of non-belief-individuating understanding is plausibly the key notion that would allow us to arrest both versions of the Pierre puzzle.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e8c16c55f6d54ac7a5e21217dde38059 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1808-1711 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2012-09-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| spelling | doaj-art-e8c16c55f6d54ac7a5e21217dde380592025-08-20T02:48:45ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1808-17112012-09-0116310.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p45120758Pierre’s Rational and Public BeliefsVictor Verdejo0Universidade Santiago de Compostela Paradigmatic cases of disagreement seem not to be compatible with a widespread kind of solution to Kripke’s celebrated Pierre puzzle. As a result, the classical puzzle about rational belief is shown to be also a puzzle about public disagreement/agreement phenomena. In this paper, I defend that the new public version of the puzzle is substantial and challenging and conclude that a full solution to Kripke’s considerations must offer a satisfactory account of both the rational and public character of belief attributions. I then argue that a notion of non-belief-individuating understanding is plausibly the key notion that would allow us to arrest both versions of the Pierre puzzle. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/28340 |
| spellingShingle | Victor Verdejo Pierre’s Rational and Public Beliefs Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| title | Pierre’s Rational and Public Beliefs |
| title_full | Pierre’s Rational and Public Beliefs |
| title_fullStr | Pierre’s Rational and Public Beliefs |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pierre’s Rational and Public Beliefs |
| title_short | Pierre’s Rational and Public Beliefs |
| title_sort | pierre s rational and public beliefs |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/28340 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT victorverdejo pierresrationalandpublicbeliefs |