Pierre’s Rational and Public Beliefs
Paradigmatic cases of disagreement seem not to be compatible with a widespread kind of solution to Kripke’s celebrated Pierre puzzle. As a result, the classical puzzle about rational belief is shown to be also a puzzle about public disagreement/agreement phenomena. In this paper, I defend that the...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2012-09-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/28340 |
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| Summary: | Paradigmatic cases of disagreement seem not to be compatible with a widespread kind of solution to Kripke’s celebrated Pierre puzzle. As a result, the classical puzzle about rational belief is shown to be also a puzzle about public disagreement/agreement phenomena. In this paper, I defend that the new public version of the puzzle is substantial and challenging and conclude that a full solution to Kripke’s considerations must offer a satisfactory account of both the rational and public character of belief attributions. I then argue that a notion of non-belief-individuating understanding is plausibly the key notion that would allow us to arrest both versions of the Pierre puzzle.
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| ISSN: | 1808-1711 |