Sur la voie de la formulation du problème de l’objectivité : concepts premiers et réforme de la métaphysique chez Tetens et Kant
In this text, I offer an investigation of the role played by “fundamental concepts” within the first sketches of two projects of a reform of metaphysics: the project of Johann Nikolaus Tetens and the project of Immanuel Kant. One year before the Berlin Academy published its famous Prize Question of...
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École Normale Supérieure de Lyon
2018-05-01
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| Series: | Astérion |
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| Online Access: | https://journals.openedition.org/asterion/3126 |
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| author | Henny Blomme |
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| author_sort | Henny Blomme |
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| description | In this text, I offer an investigation of the role played by “fundamental concepts” within the first sketches of two projects of a reform of metaphysics: the project of Johann Nikolaus Tetens and the project of Immanuel Kant. One year before the Berlin Academy published its famous Prize Question of 1761 (which asks for a comparison of the methods of metaphysics and geometry), Tetens had already published a short text in which he inquired into the causes of the small number of accepted truths within metaphysics. Although the method of geometry has to be recommended, Tetens also thinks that it cannot simply be translated into philosophy, where it never could generate the clarity it is able to bring about in mathematics. Indeed, for Tetens, an essential preliminary for a metaphysics that contains irrefutable truths and that will be able to apply the geometrical method is the inquiry into fundamental ontological concepts. As for Kant, in 1763 he explicitly replied to the question of the Academy, but it is certainly not false to state that his quest for a definitive answer ended only in 1781, with the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason. Presented as a solution to the crisis in metaphysics, this work offers a new theory of objectivity. As we know, within this theory, the first concepts of the understanding (the categories) play an important role. How come that both Tetens and Kant connected the problem of first concepts with the problem of objectivity? And who is indebted to whom? |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e88006bab41b426cb23491697faeea96 |
| institution | OA Journals |
| issn | 1762-6110 |
| language | fra |
| publishDate | 2018-05-01 |
| publisher | École Normale Supérieure de Lyon |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Astérion |
| spelling | doaj-art-e88006bab41b426cb23491697faeea962025-08-20T02:26:40ZfraÉcole Normale Supérieure de LyonAstérion1762-61102018-05-011810.4000/asterion.3126Sur la voie de la formulation du problème de l’objectivité : concepts premiers et réforme de la métaphysique chez Tetens et KantHenny BlommeIn this text, I offer an investigation of the role played by “fundamental concepts” within the first sketches of two projects of a reform of metaphysics: the project of Johann Nikolaus Tetens and the project of Immanuel Kant. One year before the Berlin Academy published its famous Prize Question of 1761 (which asks for a comparison of the methods of metaphysics and geometry), Tetens had already published a short text in which he inquired into the causes of the small number of accepted truths within metaphysics. Although the method of geometry has to be recommended, Tetens also thinks that it cannot simply be translated into philosophy, where it never could generate the clarity it is able to bring about in mathematics. Indeed, for Tetens, an essential preliminary for a metaphysics that contains irrefutable truths and that will be able to apply the geometrical method is the inquiry into fundamental ontological concepts. As for Kant, in 1763 he explicitly replied to the question of the Academy, but it is certainly not false to state that his quest for a definitive answer ended only in 1781, with the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason. Presented as a solution to the crisis in metaphysics, this work offers a new theory of objectivity. As we know, within this theory, the first concepts of the understanding (the categories) play an important role. How come that both Tetens and Kant connected the problem of first concepts with the problem of objectivity? And who is indebted to whom?https://journals.openedition.org/asterion/3126mathematicsontologymetaphysical deductiongeometrycategories |
| spellingShingle | Henny Blomme Sur la voie de la formulation du problème de l’objectivité : concepts premiers et réforme de la métaphysique chez Tetens et Kant Astérion mathematics ontology metaphysical deduction geometry categories |
| title | Sur la voie de la formulation du problème de l’objectivité : concepts premiers et réforme de la métaphysique chez Tetens et Kant |
| title_full | Sur la voie de la formulation du problème de l’objectivité : concepts premiers et réforme de la métaphysique chez Tetens et Kant |
| title_fullStr | Sur la voie de la formulation du problème de l’objectivité : concepts premiers et réforme de la métaphysique chez Tetens et Kant |
| title_full_unstemmed | Sur la voie de la formulation du problème de l’objectivité : concepts premiers et réforme de la métaphysique chez Tetens et Kant |
| title_short | Sur la voie de la formulation du problème de l’objectivité : concepts premiers et réforme de la métaphysique chez Tetens et Kant |
| title_sort | sur la voie de la formulation du probleme de l objectivite concepts premiers et reforme de la metaphysique chez tetens et kant |
| topic | mathematics ontology metaphysical deduction geometry categories |
| url | https://journals.openedition.org/asterion/3126 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hennyblomme surlavoiedelaformulationduproblemedelobjectiviteconceptspremiersetreformedelametaphysiquecheztetensetkant |