Liquidity Restrictions on Investment Funds: Are they a Response to Behavioral Bias?
Liquidity constraints imposed to shareholders of investment funds, also known as lock-up periods, represent an alternative that managers can use to implement and maintain long-term strategies. The academic literature suggests that, as a result of liquidity constraints, funds should deliver a premium...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
FUCAPE Business School
2018-01-01
|
| Series: | BBR: Brazilian Business Review |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=123056181005 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | Liquidity constraints imposed to shareholders of investment funds, also known as lock-up periods, represent an alternative that managers can use to implement and maintain long-term strategies. The academic literature suggests that, as a result of liquidity constraints, funds should deliver a premium to their shareholders, and previous studies have documented this effect. Based on this context, in this paper we analyze the effect of lock-up periods on the profitability of Brazilian multimarket funds. We used a sample composed by 4,662 multimarket funds in the period from January 2009 to February 2016. The results showed a positive effect of lock-up periods on the average profitability of the funds, as well as on their risk-adjusted return. Our discussion highlights arguments that some measures taken by fund managers to protect their strategies against impulsive behaviors of funds’ investors can present a positive effect on the performance of their funds. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1807-734X |