Content, object, and phenomenal character
The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagr...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2012-09-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/28306 |
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| _version_ | 1850066438230900736 |
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| author | Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves |
| author_facet | Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves |
| author_sort | Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves |
| collection | DOAJ |
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The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011) attempts to defend the object view; (3) refine Pautz’ (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) arguments against the object view, which mainly resort to the fact that it cannot account for the grounding role of hallucinatory experiences; (4) and finally adjudicate in favor of the content view and against the overestimation of the naïve intuition.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e68885b75b1948679513c606f8ca86d9 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1808-1711 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2012-09-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| spelling | doaj-art-e68885b75b1948679513c606f8ca86d92025-08-20T02:48:45ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1808-17112012-09-0116310.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p41720756Content, object, and phenomenal characterMarco Aurélio Sousa Alves0The University Of Texas at Austin The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011) attempts to defend the object view; (3) refine Pautz’ (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) arguments against the object view, which mainly resort to the fact that it cannot account for the grounding role of hallucinatory experiences; (4) and finally adjudicate in favor of the content view and against the overestimation of the naïve intuition. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/28306 |
| spellingShingle | Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves Content, object, and phenomenal character Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| title | Content, object, and phenomenal character |
| title_full | Content, object, and phenomenal character |
| title_fullStr | Content, object, and phenomenal character |
| title_full_unstemmed | Content, object, and phenomenal character |
| title_short | Content, object, and phenomenal character |
| title_sort | content object and phenomenal character |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/28306 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT marcoaureliosousaalves contentobjectandphenomenalcharacter |