Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection

In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto (2014) for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids pa...

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Main Authors: Mariela Rubin, Ariel Roffé
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2018-08-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58641
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author Mariela Rubin
Ariel Roffé
author_facet Mariela Rubin
Ariel Roffé
author_sort Mariela Rubin
collection DOAJ
description In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto (2014) for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids paradox, even when introduced into a language that contains self-reference and a transparent truth predicate. We will show that this proposal is inadequate because it is too incomplete. We argue that the reason it avoids trouble is that the inferential characteristics of the new operator are left (mostly) unspecified, exporting the task of specifying them to metaphysicians. Additionally, we show that when completing this proposal with some plausible rules for the rejection operator, paradoxes do arise. Finally, we draw some more general implications from the study of this example.
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series Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
spelling doaj-art-e6018e0cf85f4ce2a3ebfddf6bffd2652025-08-20T03:42:13ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1808-17112018-08-0122110.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p18929446Against a Metaphysical Understanding of RejectionMariela Rubin0Ariel Roffé1BA-Logic Group, UNACEFHIC-UNQ-CONICET, UNTREF. In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto (2014) for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids paradox, even when introduced into a language that contains self-reference and a transparent truth predicate. We will show that this proposal is inadequate because it is too incomplete. We argue that the reason it avoids trouble is that the inferential characteristics of the new operator are left (mostly) unspecified, exporting the task of specifying them to metaphysicians. Additionally, we show that when completing this proposal with some plausible rules for the rejection operator, paradoxes do arise. Finally, we draw some more general implications from the study of this example. https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58641
spellingShingle Mariela Rubin
Ariel Roffé
Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
title Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection
title_full Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection
title_fullStr Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection
title_full_unstemmed Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection
title_short Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection
title_sort against a metaphysical understanding of rejection
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/58641
work_keys_str_mv AT marielarubin againstametaphysicalunderstandingofrejection
AT arielroffe againstametaphysicalunderstandingofrejection