Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform.
In the current era of technological advancements and intense global competition, innovation in Science and Technology (S&T) has become a crucial aspect of every country's development strategy, and the development of cutting-edge technologies in core areas is of utmost importance. Innovation...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2025-01-01
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| Series: | PLoS ONE |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0323627 |
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| author | Guangsi Zhang Chen Chen Jiaping Xie Qiang Hu |
| author_facet | Guangsi Zhang Chen Chen Jiaping Xie Qiang Hu |
| author_sort | Guangsi Zhang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the current era of technological advancements and intense global competition, innovation in Science and Technology (S&T) has become a crucial aspect of every country's development strategy, and the development of cutting-edge technologies in core areas is of utmost importance. Innovation platforms that offer services for core technologies can be classified into three operational models: Public Welfare Platforms, Social Enterprise Platforms, and Commercial Platforms, depending on their objectives. To accelerate the realization of S&T innovation, the government provides subsidies to guide the S&T innovation platform and increase the participation of innovation subjects. With the help of optimization theory and supply chain theory, this paper constructed a model employing the game approach to delve into the pricing strategies of S&T platforms under three distinct models: Public Welfare Platform, Social Enterprise Platform, and Commercial Platform. The paper also discusses the effects of government subsidies on different innovation subjects. The study demonstrates that all three operational models can achieve the optimal membership fee for research users and the optimal commission rebate paid by the platform to resource providers. In the context of the Public Welfare Platform, despite the highest social welfare, the platform's profit remains negative. Consequently, price subsidies are required for research users. At this juncture, the government subsidies to the S&T innovation platform yield the greatest social welfare yet the lowest profit for the platform. In contrast, the Social Enterprise Platform entails government subsidies for resource providers and research users, which can enhance the platform's profit. The effect of subsidizing the resource providers on the profit growth of the S&T innovation platform is more significant than the effect on the improvement of social welfare. In the context of the Commercial Platform, regardless of the existence of government subsidies, the growth of social welfare and platform profits with the platform service level can be achieved. Furthermore, government subsidies for scientific research users are the most effective. These results provide theoretical and practical lessons for the pricing of the S&T innovation platform and the subject of government subsidies. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e4e406dbb44b484b9ae0129644e39a1a |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1932-6203 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | PLoS ONE |
| spelling | doaj-art-e4e406dbb44b484b9ae0129644e39a1a2025-08-20T03:13:12ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032025-01-01205e032362710.1371/journal.pone.0323627Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform.Guangsi ZhangChen ChenJiaping XieQiang HuIn the current era of technological advancements and intense global competition, innovation in Science and Technology (S&T) has become a crucial aspect of every country's development strategy, and the development of cutting-edge technologies in core areas is of utmost importance. Innovation platforms that offer services for core technologies can be classified into three operational models: Public Welfare Platforms, Social Enterprise Platforms, and Commercial Platforms, depending on their objectives. To accelerate the realization of S&T innovation, the government provides subsidies to guide the S&T innovation platform and increase the participation of innovation subjects. With the help of optimization theory and supply chain theory, this paper constructed a model employing the game approach to delve into the pricing strategies of S&T platforms under three distinct models: Public Welfare Platform, Social Enterprise Platform, and Commercial Platform. The paper also discusses the effects of government subsidies on different innovation subjects. The study demonstrates that all three operational models can achieve the optimal membership fee for research users and the optimal commission rebate paid by the platform to resource providers. In the context of the Public Welfare Platform, despite the highest social welfare, the platform's profit remains negative. Consequently, price subsidies are required for research users. At this juncture, the government subsidies to the S&T innovation platform yield the greatest social welfare yet the lowest profit for the platform. In contrast, the Social Enterprise Platform entails government subsidies for resource providers and research users, which can enhance the platform's profit. The effect of subsidizing the resource providers on the profit growth of the S&T innovation platform is more significant than the effect on the improvement of social welfare. In the context of the Commercial Platform, regardless of the existence of government subsidies, the growth of social welfare and platform profits with the platform service level can be achieved. Furthermore, government subsidies for scientific research users are the most effective. These results provide theoretical and practical lessons for the pricing of the S&T innovation platform and the subject of government subsidies.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0323627 |
| spellingShingle | Guangsi Zhang Chen Chen Jiaping Xie Qiang Hu Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform. PLoS ONE |
| title | Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform. |
| title_full | Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform. |
| title_fullStr | Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform. |
| title_short | Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform. |
| title_sort | analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0323627 |
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