Carbon emission reduction in China’s iron and steel industry through technological innovation: a quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis under government subsidies
The steel industry is notable for its significant environmental impact, highlighting the pressing need to promote technological innovation within the sector in order to reduce carbon emissions. This paper utilizes a quadrilateral evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic behaviors of steel pr...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2025-01-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Environmental Science |
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| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2024.1491608/full |
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| author | Tang Xinfa Liu Shuai Wang Yonghua Wan Youwei Musa Dirane Nubea |
| author_facet | Tang Xinfa Liu Shuai Wang Yonghua Wan Youwei Musa Dirane Nubea |
| author_sort | Tang Xinfa |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The steel industry is notable for its significant environmental impact, highlighting the pressing need to promote technological innovation within the sector in order to reduce carbon emissions. This paper utilizes a quadrilateral evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic behaviors of steel producers, construction companies, scrap steel recyclers, and the government throughout the entire steel production, consumption, and recycling processes and their impact on carbon emission reduction. The analysis and simulation of the model provide policy insights for these four key players. The study’s findings are as follows: (i) Government subsidies can effectively stimulate low-carbon production methods and encourage green consumer behavior. (ii) The strategic choices for technological innovation by steel manufacturers and scrap steel recyclers are primarily influenced by cost factors. Government subsidies for technological innovation play a crucial role in incentivizing a smooth transition to low-carbon production methods. (iii) For steel manufacturers, the carbon benefits derived from technological innovation are a critical factor influencing their engagement in such initiatives. If these manufacturers can benefit from environmental regulations, they are more likely to engage in technological innovation. (iv) The strategies of construction companies are influenced by production costs and carbon benefits associated with steel manufacturers, exhibiting threshold effects. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e422e10ae821491db6da0917e351e67a |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2296-665X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Environmental Science |
| spelling | doaj-art-e422e10ae821491db6da0917e351e67a2025-01-06T06:59:13ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Environmental Science2296-665X2025-01-011210.3389/fenvs.2024.14916081491608Carbon emission reduction in China’s iron and steel industry through technological innovation: a quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis under government subsidiesTang Xinfa0Liu Shuai1Wang Yonghua2Wan Youwei3Musa Dirane Nubea4School of Economic Management and Law, Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University, Nanchang, ChinaSchool of Civil Engineering, Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University, Nanchang, Jiangxi, ChinaState Grid Jiangxi Electric power Co., Ltd., Nanchang, ChinaSchool of Economic Management and Law, Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University, Nanchang, ChinaSchool of Economic Management and Law, Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University, Nanchang, ChinaThe steel industry is notable for its significant environmental impact, highlighting the pressing need to promote technological innovation within the sector in order to reduce carbon emissions. This paper utilizes a quadrilateral evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic behaviors of steel producers, construction companies, scrap steel recyclers, and the government throughout the entire steel production, consumption, and recycling processes and their impact on carbon emission reduction. The analysis and simulation of the model provide policy insights for these four key players. The study’s findings are as follows: (i) Government subsidies can effectively stimulate low-carbon production methods and encourage green consumer behavior. (ii) The strategic choices for technological innovation by steel manufacturers and scrap steel recyclers are primarily influenced by cost factors. Government subsidies for technological innovation play a crucial role in incentivizing a smooth transition to low-carbon production methods. (iii) For steel manufacturers, the carbon benefits derived from technological innovation are a critical factor influencing their engagement in such initiatives. If these manufacturers can benefit from environmental regulations, they are more likely to engage in technological innovation. (iv) The strategies of construction companies are influenced by production costs and carbon benefits associated with steel manufacturers, exhibiting threshold effects.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2024.1491608/fulliron and steel industrydual-carbon goalstechnological innovationevolutionary gamesubsidize |
| spellingShingle | Tang Xinfa Liu Shuai Wang Yonghua Wan Youwei Musa Dirane Nubea Carbon emission reduction in China’s iron and steel industry through technological innovation: a quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis under government subsidies Frontiers in Environmental Science iron and steel industry dual-carbon goals technological innovation evolutionary game subsidize |
| title | Carbon emission reduction in China’s iron and steel industry through technological innovation: a quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis under government subsidies |
| title_full | Carbon emission reduction in China’s iron and steel industry through technological innovation: a quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis under government subsidies |
| title_fullStr | Carbon emission reduction in China’s iron and steel industry through technological innovation: a quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis under government subsidies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Carbon emission reduction in China’s iron and steel industry through technological innovation: a quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis under government subsidies |
| title_short | Carbon emission reduction in China’s iron and steel industry through technological innovation: a quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis under government subsidies |
| title_sort | carbon emission reduction in china s iron and steel industry through technological innovation a quadrilateral evolutionary game analysis under government subsidies |
| topic | iron and steel industry dual-carbon goals technological innovation evolutionary game subsidize |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2024.1491608/full |
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