Evolution and mitigation strategies of online public opinion: An analysis using an improved replicator dynamic three-party game model.
In the digital age, online public opinion plays a pivotal role in shaping social stability, policymaking, and public trust in institutions. Given the frequent occurrence of public opinion crises, it is imperative to explore their evolutionary dynamics and effective mitigation strategies. This study...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2025-01-01
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| Series: | PLoS ONE |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0325744 |
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| author | Jiadong Chen Jie Xin Wan Ni |
| author_facet | Jiadong Chen Jie Xin Wan Ni |
| author_sort | Jiadong Chen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the digital age, online public opinion plays a pivotal role in shaping social stability, policymaking, and public trust in institutions. Given the frequent occurrence of public opinion crises, it is imperative to explore their evolutionary dynamics and effective mitigation strategies. This study develops a three-party evolutionary game model involving the government, ordinary netizens, and media/KOLs, incorporating both inter-group strategy influence and intra-group incentive effects. The model enhances traditional replicator dynamics by embedding incentive coefficients that reflect the strategic suppressive or promotive effects within each group. Simulation results reveal that changes in incentive structures significantly affect the speed and stability of opinion convergence. For instance, when the media's suppression of dissemination strategies is strong ([Formula: see text]), all groups reach near-equilibrium within 3-5 time steps, with netizen participation stabilizing above 0.99 by t = 3. However, when only the government's suppressive influence increases ([Formula: see text]), convergence is slower and displays diminishing returns. As [Formula: see text] continues to rise, netizen responsiveness plateaus, indicating a saturation effect whereby excessive suppression loses effectiveness in accelerating stabilization. These findings challenge the assumption that earlier or stronger intervention is inherently more effective. Instead, they underscore the importance of calibrated timing and intensity, as public sentiment evolves through the interplay of government response, media coordination, and audience receptiveness. Netizens respond more rapidly than institutional actors, reflecting their sensitivity to perceived information gaps. Effective mitigation of negative sentiment thus requires not only timely action but also adaptive adjustment of strategic influence in accordance with systemic feedback. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e0a66815f0644ec186f173f13fdf5b82 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1932-6203 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-01-01 |
| publisher | Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | PLoS ONE |
| spelling | doaj-art-e0a66815f0644ec186f173f13fdf5b822025-08-20T03:16:47ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032025-01-01207e032574410.1371/journal.pone.0325744Evolution and mitigation strategies of online public opinion: An analysis using an improved replicator dynamic three-party game model.Jiadong ChenJie XinWan NiIn the digital age, online public opinion plays a pivotal role in shaping social stability, policymaking, and public trust in institutions. Given the frequent occurrence of public opinion crises, it is imperative to explore their evolutionary dynamics and effective mitigation strategies. This study develops a three-party evolutionary game model involving the government, ordinary netizens, and media/KOLs, incorporating both inter-group strategy influence and intra-group incentive effects. The model enhances traditional replicator dynamics by embedding incentive coefficients that reflect the strategic suppressive or promotive effects within each group. Simulation results reveal that changes in incentive structures significantly affect the speed and stability of opinion convergence. For instance, when the media's suppression of dissemination strategies is strong ([Formula: see text]), all groups reach near-equilibrium within 3-5 time steps, with netizen participation stabilizing above 0.99 by t = 3. However, when only the government's suppressive influence increases ([Formula: see text]), convergence is slower and displays diminishing returns. As [Formula: see text] continues to rise, netizen responsiveness plateaus, indicating a saturation effect whereby excessive suppression loses effectiveness in accelerating stabilization. These findings challenge the assumption that earlier or stronger intervention is inherently more effective. Instead, they underscore the importance of calibrated timing and intensity, as public sentiment evolves through the interplay of government response, media coordination, and audience receptiveness. Netizens respond more rapidly than institutional actors, reflecting their sensitivity to perceived information gaps. Effective mitigation of negative sentiment thus requires not only timely action but also adaptive adjustment of strategic influence in accordance with systemic feedback.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0325744 |
| spellingShingle | Jiadong Chen Jie Xin Wan Ni Evolution and mitigation strategies of online public opinion: An analysis using an improved replicator dynamic three-party game model. PLoS ONE |
| title | Evolution and mitigation strategies of online public opinion: An analysis using an improved replicator dynamic three-party game model. |
| title_full | Evolution and mitigation strategies of online public opinion: An analysis using an improved replicator dynamic three-party game model. |
| title_fullStr | Evolution and mitigation strategies of online public opinion: An analysis using an improved replicator dynamic three-party game model. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolution and mitigation strategies of online public opinion: An analysis using an improved replicator dynamic three-party game model. |
| title_short | Evolution and mitigation strategies of online public opinion: An analysis using an improved replicator dynamic three-party game model. |
| title_sort | evolution and mitigation strategies of online public opinion an analysis using an improved replicator dynamic three party game model |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0325744 |
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