Locke’s Knowledge of Ideas: Propositional or By Acquaintance?
Locke seems to have conflicting commitments: we know individual ideas and all knowledge is propositional. This paper shows the conflict to be only apparent. Looking at Locke’s philosophy of language in relation to the Port Royal logic, I argue, first, that Locke allows that we have non-ideational me...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Aperio
2021-09-01
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| Series: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
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| Online Access: | https://jmphil.org/article/id/2056/ |
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| author | Shelley Weinberg |
| author_facet | Shelley Weinberg |
| author_sort | Shelley Weinberg |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Locke seems to have conflicting commitments: we know individual ideas and all knowledge is propositional. This paper shows the conflict to be only apparent. Looking at Locke’s philosophy of language in relation to the Port Royal logic, I argue, first, that Locke allows that we have non-ideational mental content that is signified only at the linguistic level. Second, I argue that this non-ideational content plays a role in what we know when we know an idea. As a result, we can see our knowledge of an idea as a form of knowledge by acquaintance: there is a direct epistemic relation between a mental object (an individual idea) and a knowing subject. But owing to Locke’s logic, that knowledge has a tacit propositional structure expressing the truth of the idea, which gains full signification only linguistically. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-e08866d946f94fceab27e6adcfbd1661 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2644-0652 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-09-01 |
| publisher | Aperio |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj-art-e08866d946f94fceab27e6adcfbd16612025-01-31T16:08:17ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522021-09-013010.25894/jmp.2056Locke’s Knowledge of Ideas: Propositional or By Acquaintance?Shelley Weinberg0 Locke seems to have conflicting commitments: we know individual ideas and all knowledge is propositional. This paper shows the conflict to be only apparent. Looking at Locke’s philosophy of language in relation to the Port Royal logic, I argue, first, that Locke allows that we have non-ideational mental content that is signified only at the linguistic level. Second, I argue that this non-ideational content plays a role in what we know when we know an idea. As a result, we can see our knowledge of an idea as a form of knowledge by acquaintance: there is a direct epistemic relation between a mental object (an individual idea) and a knowing subject. But owing to Locke’s logic, that knowledge has a tacit propositional structure expressing the truth of the idea, which gains full signification only linguistically.https://jmphil.org/article/id/2056/LockeKnowledgeIdeasAcquaintancePort Royal logicSignification |
| spellingShingle | Shelley Weinberg Locke’s Knowledge of Ideas: Propositional or By Acquaintance? Journal of Modern Philosophy Locke Knowledge Ideas Acquaintance Port Royal logic Signification |
| title | Locke’s Knowledge of Ideas: Propositional or By Acquaintance? |
| title_full | Locke’s Knowledge of Ideas: Propositional or By Acquaintance? |
| title_fullStr | Locke’s Knowledge of Ideas: Propositional or By Acquaintance? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Locke’s Knowledge of Ideas: Propositional or By Acquaintance? |
| title_short | Locke’s Knowledge of Ideas: Propositional or By Acquaintance? |
| title_sort | locke s knowledge of ideas propositional or by acquaintance |
| topic | Locke Knowledge Ideas Acquaintance Port Royal logic Signification |
| url | https://jmphil.org/article/id/2056/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT shelleyweinberg lockesknowledgeofideaspropositionalorbyacquaintance |