Barrettův bůh: Problémy reprezentacionalistického přístupu ve studiu náboženství

Justin L. Barrett in his 2008 article “Why Santa Claus is not a god” argued that a collection of a few basic representational content features can explain why a god concept can become the centre of widespread religious beliefs and practices. In this article, I demonstrate the ways in which Barrett’s...

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Main Author: Daniel Musil
Format: Article
Language:ces
Published: University of West Bohemia, Pilsen 2017-06-01
Series:AntropoWebzin
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.antropoweb.cz/webzin/index.php/webzin/article/view/241/268
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author Daniel Musil
author_facet Daniel Musil
author_sort Daniel Musil
collection DOAJ
description Justin L. Barrett in his 2008 article “Why Santa Claus is not a god” argued that a collection of a few basic representational content features can explain why a god concept can become the centre of widespread religious beliefs and practices. In this article, I demonstrate the ways in which Barrett’s representational model fails in defence of his main hypothesis, and I use his model as an example to show the limits of similar approaches in the cognitive science of religion.
format Article
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institution Kabale University
issn 1801-8807
language ces
publishDate 2017-06-01
publisher University of West Bohemia, Pilsen
record_format Article
series AntropoWebzin
spelling doaj-art-dfb2c704818d4e509b3ee7735e94857e2025-08-20T03:58:02ZcesUniversity of West Bohemia, PilsenAntropoWebzin1801-88072017-06-01131-2112Barrettův bůh: Problémy reprezentacionalistického přístupu ve studiu náboženstvíDaniel Musil0Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec KrálovéJustin L. Barrett in his 2008 article “Why Santa Claus is not a god” argued that a collection of a few basic representational content features can explain why a god concept can become the centre of widespread religious beliefs and practices. In this article, I demonstrate the ways in which Barrett’s representational model fails in defence of his main hypothesis, and I use his model as an example to show the limits of similar approaches in the cognitive science of religion.http://www.antropoweb.cz/webzin/index.php/webzin/article/view/241/268cognitive science of religionreligion and cognitionepidemiology of mental representationsreligious beliefrepresentational content biases
spellingShingle Daniel Musil
Barrettův bůh: Problémy reprezentacionalistického přístupu ve studiu náboženství
AntropoWebzin
cognitive science of religion
religion and cognition
epidemiology of mental representations
religious belief
representational content biases
title Barrettův bůh: Problémy reprezentacionalistického přístupu ve studiu náboženství
title_full Barrettův bůh: Problémy reprezentacionalistického přístupu ve studiu náboženství
title_fullStr Barrettův bůh: Problémy reprezentacionalistického přístupu ve studiu náboženství
title_full_unstemmed Barrettův bůh: Problémy reprezentacionalistického přístupu ve studiu náboženství
title_short Barrettův bůh: Problémy reprezentacionalistického přístupu ve studiu náboženství
title_sort barrettuv buh problemy reprezentacionalistickeho pristupu ve studiu nabozenstvi
topic cognitive science of religion
religion and cognition
epidemiology of mental representations
religious belief
representational content biases
url http://www.antropoweb.cz/webzin/index.php/webzin/article/view/241/268
work_keys_str_mv AT danielmusil barrettuvbuhproblemyreprezentacionalistickehopristupuvestudiunabozenstvi