A new solution to the rational voter paradox
The rational voter paradox suggests that there is no incentive for a rational individual to vote if the expected benefits are outweighed by the costs. However, the probability of an individual vote deciding the outcome of an election is typically small, making the expected benefits negligib...
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Main Authors: | Mladenović Ivan, Vasić Miljan |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
Published: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2024-01-01
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Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2024/0353-57382404957M.pdf |
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