A new solution to the rational voter paradox
The rational voter paradox suggests that there is no incentive for a rational individual to vote if the expected benefits are outweighed by the costs. However, the probability of an individual vote deciding the outcome of an election is typically small, making the expected benefits negligib...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2024-01-01
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| Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2024/0353-57382404957M.pdf |
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| Summary: | The rational voter paradox suggests that there is no incentive for a rational
individual to vote if the expected benefits are outweighed by the costs.
However, the probability of an individual vote deciding the outcome of an
election is typically small, making the expected benefits negligible. In
response to the paradox, this paper proposes a novel solution based on
Goldman’s causal responsibility approach, which asserts that voters make a
partial causal contribution to the electoral outcome even if their vote is
not decisive. The paper integrates the logic of Condorcet’s jury theorem
into the causal responsibility approach, arguing that this leads to solving
the rational voter paradox. |
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| ISSN: | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |