Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit
Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green ret...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2021-01-01
|
| Series: | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5560671 |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| _version_ | 1832556508281307136 |
|---|---|
| author | Liwen Chen Mengjia Zhang Shiwen Zhao |
| author_facet | Liwen Chen Mengjia Zhang Shiwen Zhao |
| author_sort | Liwen Chen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners’ strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-deef6e26fcab4613ac205090350bfd10 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1026-0226 1607-887X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| spelling | doaj-art-deef6e26fcab4613ac205090350bfd102025-02-03T05:45:21ZengWileyDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2021-01-01202110.1155/2021/55606715560671Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green CreditLiwen Chen0Mengjia Zhang1Shiwen Zhao2School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, ChinaExisting building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners’ strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5560671 |
| spellingShingle | Liwen Chen Mengjia Zhang Shiwen Zhao Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society |
| title | Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit |
| title_full | Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit |
| title_fullStr | Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit |
| title_short | Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit |
| title_sort | game analysis of the multiagent evolution of existing building green retrofitting from the perspective of green credit |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5560671 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT liwenchen gameanalysisofthemultiagentevolutionofexistingbuildinggreenretrofittingfromtheperspectiveofgreencredit AT mengjiazhang gameanalysisofthemultiagentevolutionofexistingbuildinggreenretrofittingfromtheperspectiveofgreencredit AT shiwenzhao gameanalysisofthemultiagentevolutionofexistingbuildinggreenretrofittingfromtheperspectiveofgreencredit |