The Influence of the Spillover Punishment Mechanism Under P-MA Theory on the Balance of Perceived Value in the Intelligent Construction of Coal Mines
The objective of this paper is to examine the game-theoretic relationship between local governments and coal mining enterprises with regard to the issue of coal mine intelligent construction. Firstly, this paper employs prospect theory to construct the value perception function and the decision weig...
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2025-06-01
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| author | Yanyu Guo Jizu Li David Cliff |
| author_facet | Yanyu Guo Jizu Li David Cliff |
| author_sort | Yanyu Guo |
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| description | The objective of this paper is to examine the game-theoretic relationship between local governments and coal mining enterprises with regard to the issue of coal mine intelligent construction. Firstly, this paper employs prospect theory to construct the value perception function and the decision weight function, which are then used to optimize the parameters of the traditional income matrix. The equilibrium point is then analyzed for stability under different conditions. Subsequently, Vensim PLE and MATLAB simulation software are employed to substantiate the impact of spillover penalties and associated parameters on the value perception equilibrium of the two parties. The results of the simulation demonstrate that, in addition to the initial strategy selected, the spillover penalty exerts a considerable inhibitory effect on the process of enterprise intelligence construction. Secondly, from the perspective of value perception, the lower the costs to enterprises of carrying out intelligent construction in terms of labor and mental effort, the more enterprises are inclined to engage in this construction. The higher the costs to enterprises of complying with strict government regulation, and the lower the costs to enterprises of deregulation, the more the government can govern by non-interference. Finally, the behavioral trends of local government departments are also correlated with additional revenue they receive from firms and the factor of fines linked to government performance. |
| format | Article |
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| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2076-3417 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-06-01 |
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| spelling | doaj-art-dd2e86b0ac914e67ba26bb4125ab45df2025-08-20T03:26:16ZengMDPI AGApplied Sciences2076-34172025-06-011512639410.3390/app15126394The Influence of the Spillover Punishment Mechanism Under P-MA Theory on the Balance of Perceived Value in the Intelligent Construction of Coal MinesYanyu Guo0Jizu Li1David Cliff2School of Economics and Management, Taiyuan University of Technology, Taiyuan 030024, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Taiyuan University of Technology, Taiyuan 030024, ChinaThe Minerals Industry Safety and Health Centre (MISHC), The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Brisbane, QLD 4072, AustraliaThe objective of this paper is to examine the game-theoretic relationship between local governments and coal mining enterprises with regard to the issue of coal mine intelligent construction. Firstly, this paper employs prospect theory to construct the value perception function and the decision weight function, which are then used to optimize the parameters of the traditional income matrix. The equilibrium point is then analyzed for stability under different conditions. Subsequently, Vensim PLE and MATLAB simulation software are employed to substantiate the impact of spillover penalties and associated parameters on the value perception equilibrium of the two parties. The results of the simulation demonstrate that, in addition to the initial strategy selected, the spillover penalty exerts a considerable inhibitory effect on the process of enterprise intelligence construction. Secondly, from the perspective of value perception, the lower the costs to enterprises of carrying out intelligent construction in terms of labor and mental effort, the more enterprises are inclined to engage in this construction. The higher the costs to enterprises of complying with strict government regulation, and the lower the costs to enterprises of deregulation, the more the government can govern by non-interference. Finally, the behavioral trends of local government departments are also correlated with additional revenue they receive from firms and the factor of fines linked to government performance.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/15/12/6394spillover effect theoryprospect mental account theoryintelligent coal mine constructionevolutionary game |
| spellingShingle | Yanyu Guo Jizu Li David Cliff The Influence of the Spillover Punishment Mechanism Under P-MA Theory on the Balance of Perceived Value in the Intelligent Construction of Coal Mines Applied Sciences spillover effect theory prospect mental account theory intelligent coal mine construction evolutionary game |
| title | The Influence of the Spillover Punishment Mechanism Under P-MA Theory on the Balance of Perceived Value in the Intelligent Construction of Coal Mines |
| title_full | The Influence of the Spillover Punishment Mechanism Under P-MA Theory on the Balance of Perceived Value in the Intelligent Construction of Coal Mines |
| title_fullStr | The Influence of the Spillover Punishment Mechanism Under P-MA Theory on the Balance of Perceived Value in the Intelligent Construction of Coal Mines |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Influence of the Spillover Punishment Mechanism Under P-MA Theory on the Balance of Perceived Value in the Intelligent Construction of Coal Mines |
| title_short | The Influence of the Spillover Punishment Mechanism Under P-MA Theory on the Balance of Perceived Value in the Intelligent Construction of Coal Mines |
| title_sort | influence of the spillover punishment mechanism under p ma theory on the balance of perceived value in the intelligent construction of coal mines |
| topic | spillover effect theory prospect mental account theory intelligent coal mine construction evolutionary game |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/15/12/6394 |
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