Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth
Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompat...
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Universidad de Murcia, Departamento de Filosofía
2023-05-01
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| Series: | Daimon |
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| Online Access: | https://revistas.um.es/daimon/article/view/480391 |
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| author | Ramiro Caso |
| author_facet | Ramiro Caso |
| author_sort | Ramiro Caso |
| collection | DOAJ |
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Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-dc5e7d87bb1a42d784c63c78f8551dc4 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 1989-4651 |
| language | Spanish |
| publishDate | 2023-05-01 |
| publisher | Universidad de Murcia, Departamento de Filosofía |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Daimon |
| spelling | doaj-art-dc5e7d87bb1a42d784c63c78f8551dc42025-08-20T02:53:04ZspaUniversidad de Murcia, Departamento de FilosofíaDaimon1989-46512023-05-018910.6018/daimon.480391Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative TruthRamiro Caso Horwich (Mind 123(491), 2014) has argued that only someone with inflationary tendencies could feel inclined to endorse truth relativism. In doing so, he argues that deflationism about truth entails the denial of relativism. If sound, Horwich’s argument could entail that truth relativism is incompatible with any conception of our ordinary truth predicate according to which there is some sort of equivalence between a ground-language claim that p and the corresponding claim that p is true. Arguably, any story the relativist might give about our ordinary truth predicate, it should entail some such equivalence. Hence, there is a problem for truth relativism that needs to be addressed. https://revistas.um.es/daimon/article/view/480391truth relativismradical relativismdeflationism |
| spellingShingle | Ramiro Caso Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth Daimon truth relativism radical relativism deflationism |
| title | Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth |
| title_full | Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth |
| title_fullStr | Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth |
| title_full_unstemmed | Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth |
| title_short | Deflationary Truth, Ordinary Truth and Relative Truth |
| title_sort | deflationary truth ordinary truth and relative truth |
| topic | truth relativism radical relativism deflationism |
| url | https://revistas.um.es/daimon/article/view/480391 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ramirocaso deflationarytruthordinarytruthandrelativetruth |