Germany’s Strategic Activity in the Sahel and the Problem of Sovereignty for Regional States: The Case of Mali
Using Mali as an example of a geostrategically important African state, the article explores the extent to which Germany’s political and military steps contributed or did not contribute to the sovereignty of the state that was trying to overcome the instability. Taking into account the ambiguous iss...
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Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for African Studies
2024-06-01
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| Series: | Ученые записки Института Африки Российской академии наук |
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| Online Access: | https://africajournal.ru/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Trunov-Germanys-Strategic.pdf |
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| author | Trunov Philipp Olegovich |
| author_facet | Trunov Philipp Olegovich |
| author_sort | Trunov Philipp Olegovich |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Using Mali as an example of a geostrategically important African state, the article explores the extent to which Germany’s political and military steps contributed or did not contribute to the sovereignty of the state that was trying to overcome the instability. Taking into account the ambiguous issue of the completeness of the sovereignty of Germany itself, the author analyzes the FRG’s fundamental ability to transfer its experience in this field to other states. In the second half of the 2010s, the scope and effectiveness of German efforts to stabilize the situation in Mali were insufficient. Germany, especially in the first stages of the settlement (from 2013 to 2015), did not make a noticeable contribution to peacemaking and peacekeeping activities. The use of the Bundeswehr in the field became noticeable only from 2016–2018; however, it did not lead to the necessary results. By the mid-2010s, Germany had already begun to take an active part in the security sector reform in Mali. However, the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the newly trained personnel of the Malian army were insufficient to ensure peace and security in the country. Having accepted the functions of one of the main external participants in the settlement, Germany did not accompany this with the necessary efforts. In addition, Germany was not ready to ensure efficiently the nationalization of the settlement, that is, to transfer control over the process to those internal forces that were capable of leading the country to peace.
The incomplete resolution of the armed conflict and its degradation since the end of the 2010s have manifested the regress of Mali’s gaining sovereignty. Therefore, the Malian militaries, since 2020‒2021, have been trying to realize another scenario without the built-in participation of Western democracies. The paper explores the perception by the new Malian powers of the German military presence in the country. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-dc2a1ef7de214f76a87d21294d6e64c5 |
| institution | DOAJ |
| issn | 2412-5717 3034-3496 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2024-06-01 |
| publisher | Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for African Studies |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ученые записки Института Африки Российской академии наук |
| spelling | doaj-art-dc2a1ef7de214f76a87d21294d6e64c52025-08-20T02:50:19ZengRussian Academy of Sciences, Institute for African StudiesУченые записки Института Африки Российской академии наук2412-57173034-34962024-06-01102157169https://doi.org/10.31132/2412-5717-2024-67-2-157-169Germany’s Strategic Activity in the Sahel and the Problem of Sovereignty for Regional States: The Case of MaliTrunov Philipp Olegovich0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7092-4864Dr.Sc. (Political Science), Leading Research Fellow, Department of Europe and America, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences (INION), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russian FederationUsing Mali as an example of a geostrategically important African state, the article explores the extent to which Germany’s political and military steps contributed or did not contribute to the sovereignty of the state that was trying to overcome the instability. Taking into account the ambiguous issue of the completeness of the sovereignty of Germany itself, the author analyzes the FRG’s fundamental ability to transfer its experience in this field to other states. In the second half of the 2010s, the scope and effectiveness of German efforts to stabilize the situation in Mali were insufficient. Germany, especially in the first stages of the settlement (from 2013 to 2015), did not make a noticeable contribution to peacemaking and peacekeeping activities. The use of the Bundeswehr in the field became noticeable only from 2016–2018; however, it did not lead to the necessary results. By the mid-2010s, Germany had already begun to take an active part in the security sector reform in Mali. However, the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the newly trained personnel of the Malian army were insufficient to ensure peace and security in the country. Having accepted the functions of one of the main external participants in the settlement, Germany did not accompany this with the necessary efforts. In addition, Germany was not ready to ensure efficiently the nationalization of the settlement, that is, to transfer control over the process to those internal forces that were capable of leading the country to peace. The incomplete resolution of the armed conflict and its degradation since the end of the 2010s have manifested the regress of Mali’s gaining sovereignty. Therefore, the Malian militaries, since 2020‒2021, have been trying to realize another scenario without the built-in participation of Western democracies. The paper explores the perception by the new Malian powers of the German military presence in the country.https://africajournal.ru/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Trunov-Germanys-Strategic.pdfformal sovereigntymaligermanyarmed conflictsresolutionregulationstrategic influencediplomacybundeswehr |
| spellingShingle | Trunov Philipp Olegovich Germany’s Strategic Activity in the Sahel and the Problem of Sovereignty for Regional States: The Case of Mali Ученые записки Института Африки Российской академии наук formal sovereignty mali germany armed conflicts resolution regulation strategic influence diplomacy bundeswehr |
| title | Germany’s Strategic Activity in the Sahel and the Problem of Sovereignty for Regional States: The Case of Mali |
| title_full | Germany’s Strategic Activity in the Sahel and the Problem of Sovereignty for Regional States: The Case of Mali |
| title_fullStr | Germany’s Strategic Activity in the Sahel and the Problem of Sovereignty for Regional States: The Case of Mali |
| title_full_unstemmed | Germany’s Strategic Activity in the Sahel and the Problem of Sovereignty for Regional States: The Case of Mali |
| title_short | Germany’s Strategic Activity in the Sahel and the Problem of Sovereignty for Regional States: The Case of Mali |
| title_sort | germany s strategic activity in the sahel and the problem of sovereignty for regional states the case of mali |
| topic | formal sovereignty mali germany armed conflicts resolution regulation strategic influence diplomacy bundeswehr |
| url | https://africajournal.ru/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Trunov-Germanys-Strategic.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT trunovphilippolegovich germanysstrategicactivityinthesahelandtheproblemofsovereigntyforregionalstatesthecaseofmali |