Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism
Pricing and promotion are two important decisions during the market launch of new consumer electronics products. Nowadays, the pricing and promotion of consumer electronic products are often not made separately but at the same time. This study focuses on the pricing-promotion coordination mechanism...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | Complexity |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5588724 |
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| _version_ | 1832549201735581696 |
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| author | Guanbing Zhao Yangyang Qiu Muhammad Imran Fazal Manan |
| author_facet | Guanbing Zhao Yangyang Qiu Muhammad Imran Fazal Manan |
| author_sort | Guanbing Zhao |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Pricing and promotion are two important decisions during the market launch of new consumer electronics products. Nowadays, the pricing and promotion of consumer electronic products are often not made separately but at the same time. This study focuses on the pricing-promotion coordination mechanism of a secondary supply chain of new consumer electronics products (which consists of a manufacturer and a seller). Price and the degree of promotion together affect the demand for products. Manufacturers give sellers a sales target. Manufacturers and sellers set prices and promotions separately, introduce repurchase penalty joint contracts, and establish supply chain profit models to compare and analyze optimal pricing, promotion efforts, and maximum profit of supply chains under different decision-making situations. We prove that the repurchase penalty joint contract can coordinate the supply chain under the assumptions of a single-period game and a multiperiod repeated game. The results show that under the repurchase penalty joint contract, when manufacturers and sellers choose high prices and high promotions at the same time, the supply chain of new consumer electronics products has the largest profit. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to study the influence of parameters on optimal decision-making and supply chain profits. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-dbca76a9e287497bbcaa202c0a4c4999 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1076-2787 1099-0526 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Complexity |
| spelling | doaj-art-dbca76a9e287497bbcaa202c0a4c49992025-02-03T06:11:56ZengWileyComplexity1076-27871099-05262021-01-01202110.1155/2021/55887245588724Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination MechanismGuanbing Zhao0Yangyang Qiu1Muhammad Imran2Fazal Manan3School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, Jiangsu, ChinaSchool of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, Jiangsu, ChinaFaculty of Management Sciences, ILMA University, Karachi, PakistanDepartment of Management Sciences, Bacha Khan University, Charsadda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, PakistanPricing and promotion are two important decisions during the market launch of new consumer electronics products. Nowadays, the pricing and promotion of consumer electronic products are often not made separately but at the same time. This study focuses on the pricing-promotion coordination mechanism of a secondary supply chain of new consumer electronics products (which consists of a manufacturer and a seller). Price and the degree of promotion together affect the demand for products. Manufacturers give sellers a sales target. Manufacturers and sellers set prices and promotions separately, introduce repurchase penalty joint contracts, and establish supply chain profit models to compare and analyze optimal pricing, promotion efforts, and maximum profit of supply chains under different decision-making situations. We prove that the repurchase penalty joint contract can coordinate the supply chain under the assumptions of a single-period game and a multiperiod repeated game. The results show that under the repurchase penalty joint contract, when manufacturers and sellers choose high prices and high promotions at the same time, the supply chain of new consumer electronics products has the largest profit. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to study the influence of parameters on optimal decision-making and supply chain profits.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5588724 |
| spellingShingle | Guanbing Zhao Yangyang Qiu Muhammad Imran Fazal Manan Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism Complexity |
| title | Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism |
| title_full | Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism |
| title_fullStr | Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism |
| title_short | Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism |
| title_sort | customer knowledge enabled innovation analyzing pricing promotion coordination mechanism |
| url | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5588724 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT guanbingzhao customerknowledgeenabledinnovationanalyzingpricingpromotioncoordinationmechanism AT yangyangqiu customerknowledgeenabledinnovationanalyzingpricingpromotioncoordinationmechanism AT muhammadimran customerknowledgeenabledinnovationanalyzingpricingpromotioncoordinationmechanism AT fazalmanan customerknowledgeenabledinnovationanalyzingpricingpromotioncoordinationmechanism |