A Post-Quantum Public-Key Signcryption Scheme over Scalar Integers Based on a Modified LWE Structure

To ensure confidentiality and integrity in the era of quantum computing, most post-quantum cryptographic schemes are designed to achieve either encryption or digital signature functionalities separately. Although a few signcryption schemes exist that combine these operations into a single, more effi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Mostefa Kara, Mohammad Hammoudeh, Abdullah Alamri, Sultan Alamri
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2025-07-01
Series:Sensors
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Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/25/15/4728
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Summary:To ensure confidentiality and integrity in the era of quantum computing, most post-quantum cryptographic schemes are designed to achieve either encryption or digital signature functionalities separately. Although a few signcryption schemes exist that combine these operations into a single, more efficient process, they typically rely on complex vector, matrix, or polynomial-based structures. In this work, a novel post-quantum public-key encryption and signature (PQES) scheme based entirely on scalar integer operations is presented. The proposed scheme employs a simplified structure where the ciphertext, keys, and core cryptographic operations are defined over scalar integers modulo <i>n</i>, significantly reducing computational and memory overhead. By avoiding high-dimensional lattices or ring-based constructions, the PQES approach enhances implementability on constrained devices while maintaining strong security properties. The design is inspired by modified learning-with-errors (LWE) assumptions, adapted to scalar settings, making it suitable for post-quantum applications. Security and performance evaluations, achieving a signcryption time of 0.0007 s and an unsigncryption time of 0.0011 s, demonstrate that the scheme achieves a practical balance between efficiency and resistance to quantum attacks.
ISSN:1424-8220