Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case Study

This paper has two aims. The first concerns the question of whether there is any essential involvement of perspectival thought in intentional agency. I defend the view that the answer is ‘no’ for one kind of perspectival thought, and ‘yes’ for a different kind. Agency does not depend on de se though...

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Main Author: Daniel Morgan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Michigan Publishing 2024-02-01
Series:Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/5181/
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author Daniel Morgan
author_facet Daniel Morgan
author_sort Daniel Morgan
collection DOAJ
description This paper has two aims. The first concerns the question of whether there is any essential involvement of perspectival thought in intentional agency. I defend the view that the answer is ‘no’ for one kind of perspectival thought, and ‘yes’ for a different kind. Agency does not depend on de se thought, but it does depend on de nunc thought. The second aim of the paper is to defend a claim about the significance of this de se–de nunc contrast as a case study. I argue that the contrast is best explained by a picture on which different kinds of perspectival thought are seen as islands. On this picture, an account of the conceptual role of one kind of perspectival thought won’t settle much about any other kind of perspectival thought. The picture is proposed as a replacement for the standard picture, on which perspectival thought is seen as a natural cognitive kind.
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series Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
spelling doaj-art-d91eab6200c94994adfe79e2d9bd665a2025-08-20T02:43:43ZengMichigan PublishingErgo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy2330-40142024-02-0110010.3998/ergo.5181Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case StudyDaniel Morgan0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2770-402XPhilosophy, University of YorkThis paper has two aims. The first concerns the question of whether there is any essential involvement of perspectival thought in intentional agency. I defend the view that the answer is ‘no’ for one kind of perspectival thought, and ‘yes’ for a different kind. Agency does not depend on de se thought, but it does depend on de nunc thought. The second aim of the paper is to defend a claim about the significance of this de se–de nunc contrast as a case study. I argue that the contrast is best explained by a picture on which different kinds of perspectival thought are seen as islands. On this picture, an account of the conceptual role of one kind of perspectival thought won’t settle much about any other kind of perspectival thought. The picture is proposed as a replacement for the standard picture, on which perspectival thought is seen as a natural cognitive kind.https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/5181/perspectival thoughtmetaphysics-firstintentional actionde nuncde se
spellingShingle Daniel Morgan
Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case Study
Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy
perspectival thought
metaphysics-first
intentional action
de nunc
de se
title Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case Study
title_full Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case Study
title_fullStr Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case Study
title_full_unstemmed Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case Study
title_short Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case Study
title_sort islands of perspectival thought a case study
topic perspectival thought
metaphysics-first
intentional action
de nunc
de se
url https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/5181/
work_keys_str_mv AT danielmorgan islandsofperspectivalthoughtacasestudy